They are going to fix the software with no changes to the design.
They don't need to change the design, that would be expensive overkill. Software updates are as close as we can get to Free. There is not a single company or human with infinite money to spend on anything, we can't always have the fantasy.
I just hope the correct conclusions will be learnt from this crash:
* have a truly independent certification process
* don't fix your physical design issues with software
* don't write and maintain software running on an airplane like the software from the start-up world: significant design flaws are not tolerable for software running in an airplane, even if they can be fixed easily.
* don't hide new systems, if there is a new system, then pilot should be trained
by the way, it's not the first time a new system caught pilot by surprised because they didn't knew about it. SAS Flight 751 is another example, ice ingestion damaged the engines, the pilots reduced the thrust to reduce stress, but an automatic system (ATR, Automatic Thrust Restoration), unknown to the pilots, put the thrust back to full power, disintegrating the engines, the plane fortunately crash landed without fatalities thanks to the pilots skills and a bit of luck.
* Boeing should really think about replacing the 737, the old design is putting too much constraints, preventing a clean design.
Too bad. I know I am now permanently reluctant to fly 737s
MCAS is not a feature to correct an unstable aircraft, it's to correct a confused pilot. MCAS is triggered if the following circumstances are right: 1) The airspeed is near stalling speed (takeoffs and landings) 2) The AOA (as reported by both sensors now) is greater than the aircraft can climb.
The problem was that 1) the AOA data was faulty, 2) it did not check if there was a disagreement with the backup system 3) The aircraft failed to reset each time it took corrective measures such that each the correction was compounded. 4) the corrective action was 3 times more than approved.
All of these things have been fixed but it also shows how many things have to go wrong for something to be catastrophic. But the max has been built on a solid foundation and that's much better than having to start from scratch.
For example, backup fire extinguishers in the cockpit? Optional. Extra oxygen masks? Optional. Advanced radar? Optional. There are hundreds of items like this on every model, whether it's Boeing or Airbus or someone else, because their customers WANT them to be optional.
And by the way, not all airlines do this. American paid for the upgrades. Southwest paid for the upgrades.
So maybe you should ask yourself why it is that Lion Air and Ethiopian Air were willing to spend huge amounts of money on a new jet, then spend some $1-$2 million on optional upgrades, and yet not include the MCAS upgrade in those options (and they were made well aware of it, as you can see from other airliners purchase of these upgrades). Or for that matter maybe you should ask why Lion Air knew that the plane was having trouble with the AoA sensors for several flights prior to the crash, and yet did not perform the required maintenance on them (a serious violation) and did not pass along information to its next crews (also a serious violation), who were caught completely unaware.
Airlines run at 2, 3% margin, and they do so by trimming costs at every possible area. Sometimes those areas are safety related. Airlines are not some doe-eyed naive little up who just trust whatever Big Boeing/Airbus tells them. They know how the planes work, they have their own pilots, they have their own engineering teams, they have their own specialists and experts, and they make decisions to sacrifice safety for savings, and they do it ALL THE TIME.
There is no excuse for a company such as Boeing, working under the regulation of the FAA, to produce any version of any model of plane which is fundamentally unsafe to fly. Period. None.
We're done here.
The biggest overarching change I would like to see is the abandonment of allowing manufacturers to extend the type rating of airframes indefinitely and designing to avoid costly recertification and training vs a true focus on safety and innovation.
>You’re saying that Boeing intentionally sold unsafe airplanes?
Yes.
>And the airlines, knowing this
You know airlines have their own engineering teams, right? And they were bought explicitly to save money.