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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by d-sc on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:29PM (#19695361)
Architecting solutions is hard. In this case, you need knowledge of motors, flight controls, sensor fusion, etc.

It’s easy to find edge cases when they present themself (tragically here). But most electrical-mechanical-software assemblies have similar issues.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:47PM (#19695473)
This case is unusual because, rather than a whole series of things that all had to go wrong before the plane would crash, this system has numerous failure modes that individually were almost enough by themselves to cause a crash. It is only astonishing that it took so long for it to happen.

In the Lion Air case, painfully inadequate maintenance contributed.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @06:40PM (#19695431)
Thus, the standards and procedures that if followed would have prevented the problem.

There is a standard that says automated controls are not allowed "authority" such that the pilot cannot counteract it.

There is a standard that says failure of a single sensor must not cause a critical failure.

Either violation alone makes the design not airworthy, and not certifiable for civil aviation, preventing both crashes.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by gizmo385 on Thursday April 18, 2019 @07:42PM (#19695765)
> In this case, you need knowledge of motors, flight controls, sensor fusion, etc.

Expertise which should be readily available at one of the world's foremost designers of high performance commercial aircraft.