That's why, if you think about a clever solution for something, and your solution depends on the letter of the standard instead on actual large scale experiments, then the risk of stumbling into big problems is large. Sure, it might be only 1-5% of the Internet that cannot use your clever solution. But historically developers opted to chose solutions that work for 99.9%, even at the cost of even more layers/encapsulation/complexity.
But to avoid creating even more of these constraints you want to keep as much as possible out of sight of the meddle boxes, lest they get ideas to start doing even more filtering. Given that crypto is now computationally inexpensive, this seems straightforward with anything that is not already in IP/TCP/UDP headers.
And yes, crypto helps with enforcing the layers, it forces engineers to move to a different part of the solution space when it comes to doing things that used to be done with DPI/snooping/etc. (A lot of the meddleboxes were sort of rational responses, like a MITM caching proxy, DNS hijacking, captive portals, blablabla. And they were quick and dirty.)
And lest you think that my viewpoint is completely at odds with network administrators - elsewhere I've argued that raw unrestricted IP access will eventually come to be seen as a bug. Surveillance companies backhaul much of their collect unhindered precisely because "Internet access" is given as an all-or-nothing condition. IP is actually horrible for addressing such concerns, which is why attempts at egress firewalls devolve into idiotic "block everything but 80/443" (and then new devices respond by working over HTTPS).
I think in the future, if we're lucky, the equivalent of firewalls will be based around type systems over PDUs, and embedded devices will be forced to specify exactly what they communicate. But those capabilities need to be kept at personal network edges (or even per-user) by devices' owners making them transparent (akin to installing a personal CA), with traffic over the centrally-controlled transit network remaining completely opaque.
So yes, putting a name on what m[ie]ddle nodes can observe is useful. But I have to ask for what end, given that any modern protocol should be aimed at reducing this "wire image" to the absolute minimum possible. The only reason necessitating still using plaintext-header TCP/UDP is because we're stuck with NAT, and the only reason to use ip.saddr is because we're stuck with egress filtering.