And lest you think that my viewpoint is completely at odds with network administrators - elsewhere I've argued that raw unrestricted IP access will eventually come to be seen as a bug. Surveillance companies backhaul much of their collect unhindered precisely because "Internet access" is given as an all-or-nothing condition. IP is actually horrible for addressing such concerns, which is why attempts at egress firewalls devolve into idiotic "block everything but 80/443" (and then new devices respond by working over HTTPS).
I think in the future, if we're lucky, the equivalent of firewalls will be based around type systems over PDUs, and embedded devices will be forced to specify exactly what they communicate. But those capabilities need to be kept at personal network edges (or even per-user) by devices' owners making them transparent (akin to installing a personal CA), with traffic over the centrally-controlled transit network remaining completely opaque.
And yes, crypto helps with enforcing the layers, it forces engineers to move to a different part of the solution space when it comes to doing things that used to be done with DPI/snooping/etc. (A lot of the meddleboxes were sort of rational responses, like a MITM caching proxy, DNS hijacking, captive portals, blablabla. And they were quick and dirty.)