To be fair the article doesn't critique using 1990s (or earlier) hardware/software. It's merely a clickbait headline. The only reference is dismissed by the very next sentence as insignificant [Boeing could be replaced with any ~~expert~~ somewhat-knowledgable person on the subject]:
> The flight-control computers have roughly the processing power of 1990s home computers. A Boeing spokesman said the aircraft was designed with an appropriate level of technology to ensure safety.
This only adds to my lowered standards when approaching NYT articles over the years. They've long been abandoning being correct for being entertaining at a seemingly accelerating rate. Which is too bad considering plenty of people continue to hold them to a higher credibility over the typical clickbaiter sites. Considering they are a subscription service I'm not convinced this is justified.
It was designed in the 1960s using technology they were completely confident would work and keep working - so it was basically 1940s electro-mechanical technology: relays, worm gears etc.
I don't think they really trusted electronics at that point, let alone computing devices for something so super critical.
No idea how that is done now though!
The "1990s home computers" power was simply an illustration of Boeing just trying to do the minimum work to move forward. Other examples that, while not bad per se, seem to indicate shortcuts:
> If one of two sensors malfunctioned, the system could struggle to know which was right. Airbus addressed this potential problem on some of its planes by installing three or more such sensors.
> Most new Boeing jets have electronic systems that take pilots through their preflight checklists, ensuring they don’t skip a step and potentially miss a malfunctioning part. On the Max, pilots still complete those checklists manually in a book.
> A second electronic system found on other Boeing jets also alerts pilots to unusual or hazardous situations during flight and lays out recommended steps to resolve them. On 737s, a light typically indicates the problem and pilots have to flip through their paper manuals to find next steps. [...] Boeing decided against adding it to the Max because it could have prompted regulators to require new pilot training, according to two former Boeing employees involved in the decision.
All of these things still get the job done, but they seem to indicate that Boeing simply wanted to do one last turn of the crank with the 737 design to compete with the A320neo, and may have rushed thing too much.
They've also hired younger, cheaper writers.
As a result, the overall quality of the product has fallen, noticeable.
[1] https://www.google.com/amp/s/deadline.com/2017/06/new-york-t...
We don't need to pay for content. The world is full of people who will write for nothing more than getting their name out there. What we need are good editors. The news media are firing the very people who could get them out of this mess they ended up in.
What we used to have that we don't have any more is a forced-delay, quality-control, gatekeeping function. This was fulfilled by the slowness of manufacturing printed content and good editors. Turns out that this is a place where cutting out the middleman, the wisdom of crowds, and automation worked against our best interests.
What are the correct numbers?
I actually edited in an extra paragraph at the end of my original post because I wanted to at least credit the author for talking more about design issues than "processing power" in the body of the article. The title is very bad, though.
I think the way you criticize the article is about as faulty as the article itself.
This piece is about detailing how the 737 is an outdated design that got patched and patched till it more or less broke. The processing power is just /one/ aspect and is given as a point of reference, like the 1968 photo.
I am no expert in aviation, but I guess it's quite a safe guess that fly-by-wire systems need more processing power than mechanical/analog designs. And that a glass cockpit with a trouble database needs more than a blinking LED and a paper handbook.
Nowhere in the article does the author claim the 737 MAX crashed because it had too weak CPUs. It is, however, one indication of an obsolete design - newer jets like the A320 or the 787 have more beefy processors for a reason.
I know I worked in 1-dimensional transportation and their 486-based onboard-processors felt cramped, the software engineers had to hack around their limitations and they wished they could switch to something newer. I doubt 3-dimensional transportation is easier to implement.
I address that in my post and I do not fault the author for pointing out design issues. My issue is with the implication that processing power is an issue.
> Nowhere in the article does the author claim the 737 MAX crashed because it had too weak CPUs. It is, however, one indication of an obsolete design - newer jets like the A320 or the 787 have more beefy processors for a reason.
Newer jets have faster processors because they're built on a newer system. If you're developing a new system, you might as well throw in some faster hardware. The cost of the hardware itself is nothing compared to the overhead development costs for avionics.
From my experience, this is not how the development of transportation systems work. They throw in faster hardware if they need it, as it is insanely expensive to do so. And I still believe glass cockpits and fly-by-wire need more computing power.
The only thing a more modern processor buys you is more memory, a faster tick rate for your RTOS, potentially an MMU if it doesn't cause substantial timing skew, and high-precision floating point. In the case of an avionics system I would imagine the requirements for fixed-point arithmetic are very well-understood at this point, so floating point doesn't buy you a whole lot and potentially creates new and exciting problems.
So I would say that 90's-era computers are plenty powerful for what they're used for.
I would not be surprised if they still use 68k in the A320 NEO.
Between specification, implementation, validation and testing, the cycles in the aircraft industry can be quite long. 5 to 10 years usually. And it's also quite costly to validate a brand new system. That being said, given the safety requirement, it's for the better.
For example if a UI display showed:
"Warning: MCAS overriding pitch up. Disable?"
Is better than a LED #234 and LED 412 are on. Consult manual for instructions.
I would imagine that a lot of the fly by wire or control systems nowadays are either analog systems or very very simple digital systems (with extreme redundancy).
Even if they could have changed the UI they still needed to hide the existence of the MCAS system, again to avoid retraining, so it's doubtful such a clear an helpful error message would be allowable.
There is a large degree of coupling between avionics hardware and software amd updating that software is prohibitively expensive. There's just no point in doing it unless you get a tangible benefit.
Furthermore, avionics systems take a long time to develop are not often rebuilt from scratch, so the hardware naturally lags far behind the computing power we're used to.
The recycling of avionics systems is definitely fueled by a desire to reduce costs. However, it's also important to note that older, mature systems with a history of service inherently offer a degree of safety compared to something which is untested.
The issue this article complains about can easily be seen as a safety feature.
To be fair, the author does spend most of the article talking about missing features and design issues rather than harping on "processing power". It is a poor title.