What about a single button to turn MCAS off and return to trim to a neutral position? Or a setting where the pilot is telling the system to ignore the sensor input.

Maybe a bit like a self driving car planes will eventually have a system where they can use visual markers as a check on what sensors are reporting.

Indeed there are many ways to design this better.

The 737 max was designed to not be any different to fly than previous 737s, so adding a button to disable this system was not allowed as I understand it.

As these two tragic accidents have made clear that specification was pretty wrongheaded...

Seriously, a MCAS indicator light (if MCAS is actively issuing commands), a big red button below it called "Disable MCAS" , and a MCAS disabled light (so pilots actually remember when it is disabled) should be more than enough to prevent this.

Besides adding the AoA disagree light AND having MCAS use a triple AoA sensor vote to determine the AoA angle.

I think they're not gonna do that because they'd lose the 737 type.

Until they are forced to. I hope that the FAA doesn't get a say here and other agencies will retract the type rating.

That may be where they will go with this but it may require a new certification and training.