This was claimed long before Pinker. But the general proposition brings with it one huge (moral? / ethical?) problem: at its heart its the argument that feeling sad for fictitious entities helps us to in some way interface better with non-fictitious entities. Terry Eagleton argues against the idea of considering fictitious people as in any way relating to real people, but I think he's wrong. The argument needs to be expanded and reversed. In reality, we regard all or almost all) other entities as fictitious. So in this way such a Humanities / Pinker argument but correct in the sense that we are as much inventing entities. However, then, a potential (moral? / ethical?) dilemma arises in that we will then expose this conceptualization on these entities to whatever degree is possible, giving us a panoply of common cultural practices such as --- but not limited to --- the attempted elimination of homosexuality, the confinement of women to the home, etc. So that which claims to liberate instead provides a superstructure for oppression.

The human brain seems not to experience or process reality so much as simulate it, since we know there are myriad ways that memories and perception don't match literal reality. I wouldn't doubt that deep, deep down at whatever amounts to the "bare metal" there isn't a recognized distinction between "fictional" and "real" entities, or even between those and the self.

Perhaps only at higher levels of abstraction that these distinctions are meaningful.