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Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by zaxomi on Friday March 29, 2019 @07:22AM (#19520642)
No, it is not unstable without MCAS. MCAS is only designed to change the trim if the airplane is hand flown in flaps-retracted, low-speed, nose-up flight. This is something almost everyone is missing: A normal flight should not encounter this.
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by pdonis on Friday March 29, 2019 @10:59AM (#19522253)
> A normal flight should not encounter this.

Plenty of normal flights fly manually for a significant portion of the climb-out after takeoff, which is exactly the portion of the flight when MCAS issues happened for the Lion Air and Ethiopian Air flights.

Also, you will have higher AoA in a bank, which can be encountered in manual flight on normal flights.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by phkahler on Friday March 29, 2019 @07:31AM (#19520687)
>> This is something almost everyone is missing: A normal flight should not encounter this.

Nobody said there was anything abnormal about the two flights that crashed. It really doesn't matter since the root problem is the plane doing things without telling anyone and then doing it wrongly. Without MCAS these accidents would not have happened.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by MockObject on Friday March 29, 2019 @10:49AM (#19522154)
> Without MCAS these accidents would not have happened.

Without MCAS, wouldn't there be accidents caused by the nonlinear pitch though?

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by salawat on Friday March 29, 2019 @10:57AM (#19522240)
No, because the air frame would not have been certified for airworthyness.
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by linuxftw on Friday March 29, 2019 @12:15PM (#19522930)
That's my understanding. So a simple 'oh we'll just disable it if the readings disagree' seems like a faulty fix. MCAS is required for safe flight. While it may be possible to operate a Max 800 successfully without it, that's not how it was designed to be flown.
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by cjbprime on Friday March 29, 2019 @03:00PM (#19524509)
> low-speed

Not sure this is right. General aviation pilots often think of wing stalls as a consequence of low speed (their planes don't have AoA indicators!) but they can happen at any airspeed: they simply happen whenever the critical AoA is reached.

I think the idea is that the extra lift generated by the nacelles due to the engine position causes the plane to reach high AoA at e.g. full engine power, not just when flying slowly.

I think it's also the case that the plane does not actually become aerodynamically unstable, it just starts to handle differently (yoke pressure-wise) in a way that fails airworthiness requirements.

So it would only cause a stall if the pilots continued to pull back on the yoke into the stall while it's not fighting them as much as they're expecting it to.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by petilon on Friday March 29, 2019 @09:33AM (#19521501)
>> A normal flight should not encounter this.

What is your source? This is not what I have been reading. What I have been reading is that the MAX has a bigger engine and this engine has been positioned forward on the wing in order to preserve ground clearance. As a result of this unusual engine position, the MAX has a tendency to pitch up during acceleration. Nowhere did I read that this doesn't happen during normal flights.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by ams6110 on Friday March 29, 2019 @09:39AM (#19521550)
MCAS only operates at high angles of attack, higher than normal flight would encounter. The reason it was even a factor in these crashes was the bad AoA sensor readings. If the AoA data had been correct, MCAS would not have been changing the trim.
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by petilon on Friday March 29, 2019 @09:52AM (#19521673)
When an aircraft pitches up, it increases the angle of attack, right? (If not MCAS would not be a fix for the pitching up problem.) And the pitching up can happen during normal flights, correct?
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by jcoby on Friday March 29, 2019 @10:56AM (#19522227)
> When an aircraft pitches up, it increases the angle of attack, right?

Yes, but not what you may be thinking. The AoA is the angle of the wing vs relative wind (the angle the wing is attacking the air). You can have high relative pitch (attitude) to the horizon but a low AoA, such as during climb. That same attitude is a full stall at slower speeds/power.

The wing doesn't care where the nose points. All it cares about is its relative angle to the wind. Once it diverges past a critical angle the wing stalls.

What appears to have happened with these MCAS issues is that the MCAS senses that the AoA is too high when it's completely normal and safe, so it auto-trims down.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by jboles on Friday March 29, 2019 @10:57AM (#19522234)
They can be related but not necessarily. Pitch is where the nose is pointed, while angle of attack is the angle at which the passing air hits the wings.

The nose can be pointed up with a low angle of attack (e.g. a climb during cruise) and conversely the aircraft can be pitched down with a high angle of attack (e.g. descent approach with flaps extended)

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by pdonis on Friday March 29, 2019 @11:01AM (#19522284)
> MCAS only operates at high angles of attack, higher than normal flight would encounter.

This is true for climb and cruise, but not necessarily true for a bank.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by 7952 on Friday March 29, 2019 @08:35AM (#19521050)
I agree that normal flight should not encounter these conditions. Although, does it actually check for air speed before activating MCAS?
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by ams6110 on Friday March 29, 2019 @08:42AM (#19521090)
As I understand it, no. But airspeed, actually Mach, is an input to the calculation of how much nose down to apply. I.e. the higher the speed, the less trim change is needed to achieve the desired effect.
Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by sergiosgc on Friday March 29, 2019 @11:02AM (#19522286)
As far as I understand, the forward positioning of the engines makes it so that the plane tends to pitch up when it is already pitching up, and tends to pitch down when it is already pitching down. This is the definition of an unstable system.

MCAS compensates this by trimming elevators. Without MCAS, it is up to the pilot to handle the unstable system.

Re:Preliminary conclusion MCAS misfired in Ethiopian's 737 m... by acqq on Friday March 29, 2019 @07:25AM (#19520664)
The way you describe it the faulty sensor would have not caused two crashes. If the code would check all these preconditions it would still ignore the AoA sensor.

It’s obvious that the code was executed during the regular flight conditions which means it has to be applied even then.

The motors simply push the plane nose up too much compared to the previous models, threating the plane to enter the stall. Once in the stall the plane is just not controllable. MCAS was there to hide that.

And now that the problem is known to the world either will Boeing provide the proper solution, no matter the cost, or there will be a third crash and that will be too much. Boring still tries to present all that as “business as usual.” It’s wrong.