> 3 - If that doesn't work, then you turn off the stab trim cutout switches.
And.. If this doesn't work either? What if it seems to make things worse? Is that switch implemented in hardware or software? I don't mean the switch itself: does it just pull a pin high/low for some controller or does it fully disconnect/shut down the offending part?
Especially for the case of "it actually makes things worse" finding that the switch was ultimately left in the "on" position doesn't really help; quite the opposite I'd say (but I'd assume any change to the switch would be logged by the black box to be able to identify this case).
Actually when I saw the altitude log of the first crash I wondered why there was such a steep descend the first time, while the following cycles were much less extreme. So that's my buildup for tomorrow's conspiracy theory, someone else do the flesh out. ;-)
If MCAS is getting some kind of erroneous AOA signal and inputting an unwanted nose down pitch, guess what? Those procedures will stop it. If pilots at airline X get to step 2 and think they're good and MCAS starts another input after it's initial 10 second trim, then they go to step 3.
If you want to speculate about something, why not start with what position investigators in both of these crashes are going to find the stab cutout switches. If they're not "off", why? MCAS or poor procedures? " https://www.airlinepilotforums.com/2779459-post40.html