You can check that the reporting app tells you that you voted for who you think you voted for.

You have no way of asserting that that was the vote that was actually counted in the reported result.

I don't know what Estonia does, but there are ways to publish the votes in a secure way that prevents anyone from decrypting a single vote, but lets anyone verify their vote was correctly counted using their own secret key.

httpp://news.mit.edu/2009/rivest-voting

Of course you need monitors from all interested parties to prevent ballot stuffing, but that's true in every election. It's up to monitors to read the voter list and verify that (probabilistically) there are no/few fake voters on it.

According to this report [1], they published the source code and provided a video recording of installing the software (sounds like a joke):

> Despite positive gestures towards transparency — such as releasing portions of the software as open source and posting many hours of videos documenting the configuration and tabulation steps — Estonia’s system fails to provide compelling proof that election outcomes are correct. Critical steps occur off camera, and potentially vulnerable portions of the software are not available for public inspection.

[1] https://estoniaevoting.org/findings/summary/

So much for a secret ballot

You can vote multiple times though and the previous votes are discarded. You can even show up on election day at the end and it well override your online vote.