Error replies should also include at least a short-text response (often along side a numeric one).
Initial connection strings might also have a text-string that says something useful to humans, like what the protocol is; just like the various multimedia container formats that were developed on the Internet rather than by 'media companies'.
Push complexity as far up the protocol stack as possible; but don't sacrifice useful extensiblity at lower levels if it makes sense. At the same time don't depend on that data staying the same (if it exists in another layer, it should be modifiable without breaking your actual protocol). FTP is a great example of a protocol that (because of connection multiplexing limitations) embeds data which should be low level in to a higher level.
If an RFC exists that describes the protocol then packed is probably OK. If no RFC described protocol or method exists, try to get as close as possible with off the shelf stuff and prototype with human readable things where possible on top of that until solid requirements for a new RFC are refined.
I always try and design in a debug mode. Turn it on and the destination will try to tell you exactly what you did wrong instead of stonewalling you.
Painful experience has taught me that you really want unique start and stop tokens, message type, message length, rev field and checksum/mac always. That at least allows you to mechanically validate and dispatch packets/messages.
You reminded me of the horror of talking to closed source things where there isn't even useful server-side debugging data. Stuff just fails or gets dropped without informing anyone why it went bad.
This also applies to things like my credit card - I would love to have the last week or two of even /failed/ attempts at using my card in my online statement. That would really, really help with figuring out if someone was trying to use my card, or if a given service that rejected use of my card even tried to hit the CC company. (This happened with a major travel site which probably did it's own processing; having a firm direction to push and solid data might have helped.)
I had some young feller tell me some time back why ASN.1 was the anti-christ, but I can't remember (for the life of me why). Do you happen to know/remember why ASN.1 is 'bad'?
I can write 8-bit assembler to it - I can write 32- or 64- bit compiled C to it, and it's pretty easy to create an FPGA pre-processor (and router) for it, and it certainly is more constrained than random JSON strings. What's wrong with ASN.1? Too old?
But mostly ASN.1 comes from the same "bad neighborhood" as CORBA, X.400, X.509, OSI protocols, etc.
Whenever (way back in the day) we (our/my company) did SET (secure 3P "secure" credit card protocol) with competitors (MS/HP/RSA/IBM/Netscape/etc.), because we compiled an interpreter from the spec, we were able to put in code-path switches depending on the counter party and adapt. Since they had a buggy compiler from a 3rd party - they could not.
Was that an issue with ASN.1? Or crappy tooling that people used?
I had to resort to a 409 dump
In my dozen plus years of working with them, I've not seen a large change like this. And TBH, there are way to structure them to make sure they handle changes.
I mostly deal with hardware that has to be stable in the field for years, so maybe that's the difference.