Even at the more generous level of “mental illness is different from physical illness” it is wrong, and dangerously so.
> The word "illness" should be used to represent a cause-- and resolving the cause should cure the illness.
This has never been what “illness” means; illness (both in general and in specific named instances) is often recognized and identified long before causes.
> The conditions which we call mental illness don't have a knowable cause.
They don't usually have a known cause. That they don't have knowable cause is an unwarranted conclusion. Plenty of physical illness don't have known mechanisms, and most of those that do were noticed and given names as illnesses before (sometimes centuries before) the mechanism was identified. This doesn't mean they don't generally have knowable causes, as is evident from the ones whose causes were later learned.
> Illnesses should be hypothetically curable.
That doesn't even remotely follow. Having a know cause doesn't imply curability because causes are not necessarily reversible.
> I think often the hacker news crowd forgets how ill-informed most of the world is
True. It's easy to forget that many people do not even realize that pattern matching on symptoms is how much diagnosis of physical illness is done, and that even where causes are known it's often not worthwhile (and sometimes not practical) to actually test for them directly.
The dangerous thing is to presume that's not true. Or even worse: to lie about it. The phrase "chemical imbalance" comes to mind. Complete and utter fabrication of a physical cause.
It may be that a physical cause is discovered for some conditions which today are considered "mental illnesses"... say, schizophrenia. Well, when that happens it will stop being known as a mental illness and just a physical illness.
No, it's not, it's a subset of physical illness. It's not even possible for it to be otherwise without magic.
Then it was removed. What happened? Did it stop existing? No. Were homosexual individuals "cured"? No.
Quite simply, the psychiatric community decided that individuals with same-sex desires were not, _and never had been_ mentally ill. The illness was no more.
The same is not true of physical illness.
Different argument:
The diagnostic criteria for "mental illness" overlap. So it's possible to be diagnosed with say, ADD and "Bipolar type 2" and "generalized anxiety disorder".
Which is it? Which illness does the patient have? How does one decide? Which _physical_ mechanism is responsible for one vs the other two?
Physical illness has no such ambiguity.
Nobody knows. Because the map does not map to reality. It's like asking if a hot dog is a kind of sandwich. Maybe. Who cares. It's the wrong question.
Last example:
People suffering from grief/bereavement match many, if not all, the diagnostic criteria for "Depression". Are they depressed? Or are they merely grieving? The answer (if you're a psychiatrist) depends on which volume of the DSM you use (the latest one does not exclude bereavement from the diagnostic criteria).
Is there similar subjectivity with physical illness? No. So they are clearly categorically different kinds of diagnoses, and Thomas Szasz's argument is that for that reason we should not use the word "illness" to talk about these kinds of very real problems.
I think GP's point is that you can't determine a mental illness with physical characteristics/measurements. Can you diagnose schizophrenia with a blood test? X-Rays? Nope. Perhaps an MRI? Maybe, though AFAIK this still isn't really possible.
With physical illnesses it's easy. Broken bone. Cancer. Viral infection. All of these can be diagnosed without communicating to the patient at all, simply by making physical observations using chemistry and physics.
Not so with mental illness. With mental illness you basically have to just talk to the patient, take their word at face value, and then deduce based on symptom pattern matching. A determined fraudster could fake a mental illness, and it would be impossible for doctors to be able to tell AFAIK (correct me if I'm wrong), the same which cannot be said for tumors.
Perhaps consider: what things would someone who calls some things “mental illnesses” and not call them “physical illnesses”, contrasted with the things they would call “physical illnesses” and would not call “mental illnesses”. What name would you give to these two categories?
I am reminded of a conversation I had with my dad, perhaps 5 years ago, where he referred to something as a plant, and I was confused because he meant that in a way that excluded trees, while I hadn’t interpreted it that way. Now, of course, in the technical sense, trees are plants, being members of the kingdom Plantae. But at the same time, if one is in an area with 5 trees, and a plant which is not a tree, and someone tells you “look at the plant”, the pragmatic way to interpret what they mean, is that they want you to look at the plant (i.e. the plant which is not a tree).
Scott Alexander said (as a paraphrase/snowclone of Christ’s “The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath.”) “The categories were made for man, not man for the categories.”.
Edit: small formatting fix
Autopsies of mentally ill individuals (no history of drug use) and chronic drug users that developed mental illnesses have found many of the same structural defects in the brain.
After the Enlightenment, Church was separated from State, but the need for the subjugation of thought criminals remained. In fact, the first psychiatrists asserted that the witches of the Inquisition were in fact just insane people.
The Soul was rebranded as the Mind, and heretics were rebranded as insane while the truth about the mind remained a mystery.
If we understood bleeding as poorly as we understood cancer, then everything from R&D for better bandages to public campaigns to reduce gun violence would be lumped together as "treatment for bleeding."
There are many types of cancer just like there are many types of bacterial infection. But they are both well identified. We can see the cancer cells and bacteria, and when they are gone, the patient is cured.
Mental illnesses are more like the "flu-like syndrome". The causes can range from leukemia to heroin withdrawal to a wide variety of viral infections like AIDS, the common cold, and of course, the flu. You can treat the symptoms with Tylenol but we can't really call that a disease, more like the symptoms of a yet undiscovered disease.
Also, once it's there, we know it's there, and we know exactly how to cure it: destroy all the cancer cells. The hard part is doing it without killing you in the process, and making sure that not a single cell is left in the end.
Just because we don't know now, doesn't mean we will never know. That's how science works.
People have 'mental illness' because of mental problems, not physical problems.
Also: everything has some genetic component, this is trivially true. Genetics are what separates humans from dogs and plants. It doesn't necessarily help us to explain the phenomenon adequately.
Also also: another way science works is its inability to prove negatives. Therefore, saying, "someday we might discover this" can be said for pretty much anything that remains unproven.
If your identical twin has schizophrenia, there is a 48% chance that you will have it too. This is compared to the chance of the general population, which is something like 1%. This feels like something is physically wrong in those who are schizophrenic. I don't know how else you would get that kind of result.
However. There's a dangerous perspective held by a conservatively-minded minority of more people who say mental illness "isn't real" and you just need to "suck it up" and "have stronger character", and it amounts to victim-blaming. Arguing to eliminate the insanity plea sounds very much along those lines, regardless of what the book said. Whether the doctor in question falls into that camp or not, it's a dangerous line to walk.
Personally I think of mental illness as analogous to obesity: it is simply a current state of being, and a spectrum at that. But it's important not to let it slide outside the realm of medicine and of having factors outside of the victim's control. People have fought long and hard for that ground and it's understandable they would feel threatened when someone (even just seemingly) tries to undercut it.
I don't think most cases of depression are an illness for the same reason that I don't think that hunger is an illness. It's the body and mind's natural response to a life which it wasn't evolved to cope with. Which isn't at all the same thing as telling people to suck it up. If everyone is forced to take drugs in order to thrive in what civilization has become, it's not the depressed person who is sick.
Like if a building is on fire, you don't just do first aid on people that get burned. You evacuate the building and put the fire out.
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/directors/thomas-insel/blog/2...
The situations with those two patients is revealing - the same genetic condition underlying two different diagnoses. The same treatment. The fact that not everyone with those conditions has the same defect or can benefit from that treatment. The field really is in its infancy. But sometimes there really is a physical cause and treatment.
That being said, while "bipolar disorder" is clearly a disease, or like cancer, a set of diseases, it is true that the mental health profession has an unfortunate long history of making non-majority personality traits "mental illnesses" -- homosexuality was considered a mental illness until the mid 1970s, for example.
There's many non-mental diseases that we don't yet understand fully enough to know how to cure completely. There are many diseases where there are varied causes of the disease, where we are still learning these causes, and still learning what could be a cure. Should all these not be called an illness too?
The disease like this that I'm most familiar with is Cystic Fibrosis. 35 years ago, doctors had no idea what caused it. Now we know it is genetic. However, the disease is caused by many different possible combinations of gene mutations and we're still discovering more that can cause it. There's currently over a thousand gene mutations that cause Cystic Fibrosis. While a lot of progress in slowing disease progression has been made, there is no cure. We're not even certain about what would be needed for a full cure as science is still learning about the full extent of the disease. Cystic Fibrosis does not meet your criteria for an illness either. Should we not call it as such? I think that would be absurd. It is clearly an illness.
Just because we don't fully understand a disease yet doesn't mean it can't be called an illness. If you want to come up with a new word that can clarify the fact that we don't fully understand it yet, I guess that's fine, but I don't like confusing people by trying to deny the common understanding of a word.
I think that's actually the crux of the argument. The phrase "mental illness" IS the perversion of a common understanding of a word. When people hear "illness" they think "thing that is broken". Is a runny nose an illness? No, the flu is an illness.
I don't think it's about whether we fully understand the cause or not; I think it's about whether or not we think there probably is a single, physical cause.
So we absolutely should call Cystic Fibrosis an illness even if we don't know the cause, because we think there probably IS one. And heck, there may be two causes! And then... well, then it would be TWO illnesses with similar symptoms, not one.
At this point I'm straying from the book because I don't remember it too well, so this is editorializing: I don't think that holds for many mental illnesses.
"Depression"--do we think there's one, or few, underlying physical causes of it? Highly doubtful. And we know it's highly doubtful because the treatments that make the symptoms go away are so varied in their mechanisms of action and effectiveness. Exercise. Sunlight. Changing jobs. Medication. Time. Talk therapy. All these things "work", to some degree or another, but the odds that they are targeting the same underlying, malfunctioning, physical mechanism are very slim. So one would say "depression is not an illness, the same way a runny nose is not an illness. It's a pattern."
Would that be a correct interpretation of your thoughts?
Yes. You are absolutely correct! It is pedantic.
It's also pedantry in pursuit of a point. By characterizing a group of symptoms as a disease, we coerce it into the mental model of a germ-caused disease. Which is to say there's one unifying and underlying cause, which can be ideally be addressed in a unified way that reflects the singular cause.
Szasz would not agree that Cystic Fibrosis is an illness. He would argue that it's thousands of illnesses with the same set of symptoms. His point would be that calling Cystic Fibrosis "an illness" is misleading and confuses people by denying the common understanding of a word.
The underlying point from Szasz being that illnesses need to be conceptualized in a meaningfully narrow way so that causes can be identified and a way to address them found. Otherwise medicine might wind up deeply invested in a quest to cure coughing and ignoring what coughing might be a symptom of.
Again, you're absolutely correct. The point at hand is incredibly pedantic. Might it also, perhaps, be a useful one as well?
Straw man argument and incredibly insensitive. The proposed causation between diagnosis and excuse making behavior is ridiculous. People will make excuses regardless of their knowledge of a diagnosis. It's about what they _want_ to do and their level of comfort with confrontation.
Medicine will continue categorization because it assists with treatment. IMO, it's stigma like your pov that needs to be re-educated.
"that there's a certain fatalism that one experiences once they've been "diagnosed" with mental illness."
I argue that the right education about mental health applied to the mass population would greatly mitigate the occurrences of many if not all of the arguments here.
I don't have the book available at the moment, but in the introduction he says something to the effect of "I don't regret writing this book, but I regret calling it what I did, because people judge it without reading it."
The gut-reaction to such a title is to think the writer is saying "depression doesn't exist" or "schizophrenia doesn't exist" or "manic depressives are lying."
This isn't what he says in the book at all. Rather, his argument is more along the lines of:
1. The word "illness" should be used to represent a cause-- and resolving the cause should cure the illness. Cancer, the flu, hyperparathyroidism--all map to causes.
2. The conditions which we call mental illness don't have a knowable cause. They are symptoms which we pattern match against.
3. Corollary: Illnesses should be hypothetically curable. There may be a cure for cancer. But there cannot be a "cure" for most "mental illnesses" because there is no shared, physical cause that underlies say, all cases of "bipolar disorder".
3. So we shouldn't call them "illnesses". We should call them something else.
Unfortunately that's about as much as I remember of his argument, but it's very different than the common accusation... And it also strikes me as accurate.
The problem with naming things is that it makes them real. I think often the hacker news crowd forgets how ill-informed most of the world is, and the degree to which people crave certainty.
When a person is told by a psychiatrists "Your 8 year has depression so we'll put her on X pill" or "You have bipolar type 2, so I recommend Y medicine", it has a certain finality.
Most people don't think "The doctor is telling me that my behavior matches some patterns. That is it. She does not know why, and we may never know why, there may not even be a reason why. So we should think about what we can do to mitigate this."
No. The we think "I've been diagnosed with a disease. (Sorry I'm being an a-hole|I won't go to your party|didn't get out of bed), I suffer from bipolar and there's no cure".