>Sure, a keylogger could eventually get all of the passwords I use on the regular, but it couldn't get literally every password I have and in a nice, neat format along with where the passwords are used.

But passwords aren't just about you, they're about the server they're also stored on too. Without a password manager, how do you propose remembering unique fully random passwords for dozens to hundreds of services over the course of decades? And they must still be easy enough to enter that most people will actually use it. And also be trivial to change at will, for when (not if) the password database is compromised. And in fact you directly bring up the problem of that being worse for services you use extremely infrequently. So if you use it frequently the keylogger gains it anyway, and if you don't use it frequently then what's your usable system again? Also, are not the most important things you want taken the least also the ones that tend to be used the most frequently? And with access to your email and in fact all communication services used on that system you don't see how an attacker wouldn't just be able to "I forgot my password" for many if not most services?

>Reading the current password from memory = keylogger, I'm not worried about that.

You're not worried about your system being rooted? I'd say you have an awfully different set of priorities when it comes to security then most of the world even beyond HN.

> how do you propose remembering unique fully random passwords for dozens to hundreds of services over the course of decades?

not fully random, but:

make up an algorithm that uses pieces of data that you know you can derive from some superficialities of anything you need a password for plus some some obfuscation function and some other data that you can derive or remember that is not related to the thing you need a password for.

e.g: the name of the site and the month you signed up in leet speek, rot-5'd and alternating letters, interspersed with symbols at some period related to a rhythm you like.

doing this gives you relatively strong passwords that you can reliably recreate while not needing to memorize them, that do not have an obvious pattern to them even if looking at them in mass, that have a very low chance of collision. you can remember a fairly complex recipe pretty easily ;)

depending on where your passwords are and what they're for, this might be preferable than storing them in one app that can compromise every password you have.

either way, someone only needs your important pw once. use multi-auth.

What you're basically describing is no-sync password managers[1], with all of its disadvantages (password changes/rotation, username storage, etc) but also with security by obscurity instead of a proven KDF.

[1] I'm not sure what they're called exactly, but basically all you do is enter a password and it generates your password using your password + site + KDF.

correct, the point of doing something like what i'm describing is to have a system for keeping / creating N unique passwords stored only in your head, in a way that provides an acceptable amount of strength, avoids disclosing all of your passwords if one is compromised, and doesn't require you to be a savant of long-random-string memorization.

there are plenty of things that this isn't an appropriate approach for, and fwiw I wouldn't tell someone it would be a good strategy for all their passwords.

it can be useful when you have a set of longer lived passwords that you need to care about guaranteeing that the entire set can't be snarfed without holding you at gunpoint.

Your strategy doesn't negate the need for a password manager for all of your non-essential web accounts.

And then what happens when that has to change every 30 days?

for the example above, you could chunk-rotate, change the rot-degree you use as obfuscation or have other variants of your algorithm.

there's a point somewhere a bit faster than monthly-expiration where I would consider using a store and random gen in situations where i would otherwise not. really depends on you, what it's for, and what risks you need to care about the most.

How do you propose to change your password after a breach?

> And in fact you directly bring up the problem of that being worse for services you use extremely infrequently. So if you use it frequently the keylogger gains it anyway, and if you don't use it frequently then what's your usable system again? Also, are not the most important things you want taken the least also the ones that tend to be used the most frequently?

I don’t login to my online banking from my computer very often, nor do I login to government / tax services frequently. I’d be pretty upset if the credentials for these things (especially in the case of some banks, the second password required to perform any kind of transfer operation) got compromised simply because my entire password database got dumped from machine memory without having been used.

A notebook and pencil in your desk drawer solves this problem reasonably well if you're patient. In some ways that is more secure than having all the passwords stored where an attacker can grab them from the comfort of their living room.

.. and when you are trying to log into one of those accounts when you are away from your desk drawer?

Take photo of your note and store it on imgur /s

You wait 'til you get home? Personally, I use 1Password, but I have a friend who swears by the notebook approach. He also caries a feature phone and uses a desktop computer, which makes it a lot more practical.

What are you doing to do if your home burns down? If it's an emergency and you can't wait until you get home? If industrial espionage efforts involve stealing a notebook from your home?

Back up, my man! 3-2-1. 3 copies, 2 local different media, one off site. If your data's that important, secure the offsite with an attorney.

If you want people to not have your information you just turned this into multiple SPOF situation. Now I have to secure everything.

There's no such thing as a multiple SPOF; that's called a multiple point of failure, which is a good thing.

Security is a battle of convenience. If your threat model is state actors, then it may well be worth the inconvenience to have your data secured in several different locations, running Tails OS on everything, scrapping your smartphone, and so on.

> that's called a multiple point of failure, which is a good thing.

Totally leaving aside the argument you were in - multiple single points of failure are bad, and very different than the opposite of a single point of failure.

Having a SPOF means one thing will take you down. Having multiple SPOF means any one of those can take you down. Lack of any SPOF means no one thing will take you down, it will require multiple problems. 3 distinct options.

Ahh, you're totally right. I'll scratch out my post so I don't spread misinformation.

Edit: hm, too much time elapsed for me to edit the parent post

At some point you're going to enter the master password to unlock the next password, at which point it will be stolen, giving up every password.

Only with additional work, if the attacker also extracts your password file. That's something I'd like some resistance against anyway, so malware can't simply do that and potentially decrypt it a few years down the line.

This of cause doesn't help against a resourceful and highly targeted attack, but that's less of a concern for me than some malware toolbox adding support for common password managers.

Also, on Windows, KeePass at least offers the option to always ask for the master password only in the same secure desktop that UAC and login/logout use. (I don't know why this isn't the default behavior, other than maybe cross-platform compat, but it is not the default. First thing I turn on for fresh installs.) That at least helps mitigate against most software keyloggers / remote automation hack attempts. (Leading the threat concerns back to rootkits and physical hardware access.)

Is that different? "Eventually get all of your passwords" sounds just as bad to me, especially since only some passwords are worth anything and my email password can be used to reset all other passwords.

You can't reset my online banking login password by email.

You can't reset my online banking operation password by email.

You can't reset my crypto wallet passwords by email.

If you can read all of these from memory without me ever having interacted with the password, you can take all my money and then what do I do?

The malware just waits until you use one of these passwords? The threat model of "I have these crazy essential passwords that I literally never use" is worthless. It costs the malware author nothing to wait.

Malware is like any other threat to any system. The longer it persists, the more likely it is to be detected and purged.

Malware that exists purely transiently in my system is a lot more likely to be successful and remain undetected, than malware that persists.

What bank does not use 2FA?! Only having your password should not expose your banking.

Masterpassword compromised = all compromised.