Or perhaps their fallibility in the field and readiness to acknowledge their shortcomings in it promotes lots of cooperation with and review by experts. You note narrowness, but what's more narrow than expecting a single expert in one or more fields to have a comprehensive view about anything, even their own subject much of the time? I can't think of a single person in computer science that I would trust to know everything about that topic, so why would I trust that person to cover it well over someone that has spent a career coordinating information from different people and attempting to distill it to an audience that may not be familiar with it?
And to be clear, I don't see computer science as special in this regard. I think most things interesting enough to cover are probably complex enough that multiple people are likely required to get a full picture of it.
I never said I don't read much non-fiction. I spend nearly all my time reading non-fiction. I said I don't spend 'huge' amounts of time reading popular non-fiction.
1. The reasoning holds independent of how much I have read. 2. I'm not unfamiliar with books written by journalists.
* All the shah’s men, by Stephen Kinzer, about how the 1953 coup against the democratically elected prime minister of Iran Mohammad Mosaddegh was orchestrated.
* The Idea Factory, by John Gertnee, about the history of Bell Labs
* A mind at play, by Jimmy Soni and Rob Goodman, about Claude Shannon
* Ike’s bluff, by Evan Thomas, about Dwight Eisenhower
* The Wise Men, by Walter Isacsson and Evan Thomas, about diplomats during the Truman administration
I tend to be more skeptical about books written by journalists that relate to some specific topic rather than historical narrative. Additionally, I tend to read the historical narratives with more skepticism than I do when I read history books written by professional historians.
There’s a reason the “criticisms” section of the wiki is one of the largest and links to a full article on it. It’s a religion, not an evidence-driven theory. Prescriptive, not descriptive.
I suppose we would agree to disagree if you believe in ideas not grounded in reality (a.k.a. backed by empirical evidence).
Anyway, I definitely second your point. I wonder if “Capital in the 21st Century” will be relevant for the entire century (although doubtlessly won’t be as consequential as Marx’s series).
How about another example: Bill Bryson. He's a brilliant writer and I really like all of his books. Except for A Short History of Nearly Everything. That's mostly a regurgitation of other popular science writers; it is a good read, but if you are fond of the genre, you'll spot his sources and it kind of ruins the effect.
Compare those with J.E. Gordon on structures and materials, John Clark's Ignition (which is a collection of amusing anecdotes and settling scores, I admit; the closest in my field is M.A. Padlipsky), Peter Ward (Gorgon), or Mark McMenamin (The Garden of Ediacara, some thumbs up).
If you want to know the story behind some event, journalists are admirably well suited to tell it. If you want to know about some field, they really aren't. In a world full of books, reading a journalist writing about phlebotomy or biochemistry is probably not all that useful.
I'm definitely in agreement about your Dijkstra amnesia effect.
Read the book! It is a excellent read. There are technical details in it a-plenty.
_When Genius Failed_ isn't simply a description of a scandal, but also a pop-grade exploration of the technical factors that led to the scandal. The book is impossible to write without conversance with its technical subject matter. Which is my point: Lowenstein wasn't a quant, but he was able to accurately and effectively write on them.
For example, when discussing LTCM volatility strategies: >The stock market, for instance, typically varies by about 15 percent to 20 percent a year. Now and then, the market might be more volatile, but it will always revert to form—or so the mathematicians in Greenwich believed. It was guided by the unseen law of large numbers, which assured the world of a normal distribution of brown cows and spotted cows and quiet trading days and market crashes. For Long-Term’s professors, with their supreme faith in markets, this was written in stone. It flowed from their Mertonian view of markets as efficient machines that spit out new prices with all the random logic of heat molecules dispersing through a cloud. From this quote it looks like Lowenstein believed that 1. Volatility is not mean reverting 2. The reason people at LTCM believed volatility was mean reverting was due to complex mathematical models rooted in market efficiency. Now, volatility mean reversion is something that can be easily seen by looking at a graph of volatility over time [1].
Also, Lowenstein does not do a good job at describing the way LTCM modeled risk, and the way it failed. In fact, he barely even tries. He just hints here and there about "correlations going to one", but nothing more. For example, which assumptions failed? Did they assume that different kind of bets (relative value between bonds, merger arbitrage, arbitrage between double-listed equities, etc) were uncorrelated? Did they get hurt more by different kind of bets being correlated, or by some bets going particularly wrong? Did they stress test their risk measures in any way?
[1] E.g. https://a.c-dn.net/b/4tKv1V/Forex-Trading-Video-SPX-and-VIX-...
You are in no position to judge how accurately or effectively it was written (unless you judge effectiveness as entertaining you).
It doesn't help that everyone's attention is being hacked simultaneously. Nor does it help that the internet allows you to reach everyone on the planet, whether you are worthy of that reach or whether they are worthy of your words.
All I know is in such an environment in flux pointing out hypocrisy is a waste of time. Let it play out. Give it another 10 years.
So, your argument against a rule of thumb - a broad, sweeping heuristic never meant to account for all possibilities, and by definition not to account for outliers - is that outliers exist?
Well, I readily grant you: every rule of thumb, ever, has failed miserably at accounting for outliers.
Seeing as how the post you're addressing was written how to triage the endless flux of books given finite time, I rather think their point was, you know, how best to handle the general case - not the outliers.
Rather like, "I will never read fiction whose cover is a sexy lady in all leather holding a knife and leaning on a motorcycle." It's not only likely, but certain, that that will end up excluding really good fiction. But, playing odds on where to devote my time, it's a better bet to avoid such books than not, given my reading preferences.
And I'm very comfortable with the rule that "non-experts attempting to digest and relate complex topics will tend to (a) not be experts, and thus (b) misunderstand, and (c) relate that misunderstanding to their readers, on average, and certainly are far more likely to than relevant experts." E.g., Malcolm Gladwell, who has an excellent reputation for his writing, just so long as you're not familiar with any of the things he writes about. Or 99% of pop-sci books ever written on the topic of quantum physics.
"Don't read books by journalists that aren't about journalism" is a bad rule of thumb.
Ever since YC had an RFS about replacing Wikipedia I’ve thought about how it needs to change. There are many shortcomings including the fact that it is hard to edit for a number of reasons, but most importantly going to a Wikipedia page at one point in time only captures that information which may be right at the time or wildly off or as you point out full of omissions. Information shouldn’t be deleted but instead we should see meta information like how other experts weigh in. If someone points to the Wait But Why article on AI it will be backed by the author and Elon Musk (who are both dilettantes), and maybe we can see some experts gave it a low rating.
Part of the problem I see is that often so called experts are just those who are rabidly vocal while the actual experts are heads down becoming better experts. So while we might see hand waving about killer AI from several “experts” we only have a few people who occasionally interject like Rodney Brooks. (This is a bit why I’m not very optimistic about several of these startups trying to show consumers “the truth;” indeed, the Dijkstra amnesia effect.)
Wow. Lord knows Wikipedia has problems, but replacing it with a VC-backed startup would be a disaster.
Then there are things like economics where even the experts in their field can’t agree on either theory or in data interpretation. If they can’t reach consensus being informed and all, imagine someone in a different field like journalism trying to write expertly.
As we can obviously see, even professionals in medical sciences were wrong about Theranos. How did John Carreyrou, a WSJ reporter, do such a good job reporting on them?
It was highly read and picked up by armchair experts everywhere leading to lots of outrage against... not much in particular other than evil Wall Street people stealing muh money.
The Big Short is in a similar category although it wasn’t really an ad so much as an excuse for everyone who overleveraged on their mortgage to pat themselves on the back and shirk the responsibility of financial ignorance onto “evil Wall Street people”. The movie (while entertaining) was even worse.
>As we can obviously see, even professionals in medical sciences were wrong about Theranos. How did John Carreyrou, a WSJ reporter, do such a good job reporting on them?
Simple, medical professionals aren’t equipped to sniff out business fraud signals like investigators of businesses. Given that Theranos didn’t have technology, it didn’t take any more medical expertise to explain that then it took medical expertise to explain Bernie Madoff.
W/re economics. We have the likes of Fukuyama and Krugman who have influence on Americans with regards to economics but who are often taken as oracles, rather than accepting they are economics thinkers who can be wrong.
My argument isn't "all books are good". That would be a stupid argument. My argument is that these rules suck.
Whether the particular books you refer to are false negatives on these heuristics is of course a matter of opinion. I don't know Woodward and Bernstein's book on constitutional law; their most famous book, All the President's Men, would surely fall under a similar exception to biography/memoir, since it is an account of their own investigation.
A book about investigative journalism by investigative journalists is rather different.
Edit: ... which obviously doesn't make the book any less interesting.
In other words there's no reason to believe the author would miss any of the books you mentioned by his "journalist disdain".
?
Probably an accurate statement really.
Neither of their books were really about constitutional law. "All the President's Men" is in the "Books about journalism" section of Wikipedia.
If you want a replacement example that isn't make that point, substitute in Lawrence Wright and either scientology or terrorism.
So yes, mistakes are expected initially. But the job of the author is to get enough outside eyes to fix it. Historians go to great lengths to ensure they aren’t just repeating a single view of an event. Most authors do not seem to make any similar effort.
Also, the idea that the errors software developers make don't have a broad impact on society is a bit of an eyebrow-raiser for me, but that might be a function of the subfield of software that I happen to work in.
It’s also an eyebrow raiser to me, given that’s not even close to what I said. “Having an impact != misrepresent”.
I suspect I’ll be a long time waiting for you to make any correction to your comment that misrepresented what I said though, which is funny given the conversation.
I don't think these are very good rules.
I thought it was especially amusing that this person doesn't trust journalists to write about anything but journalism. If you believe that, why are you interested in reading about journalism in the first place?
HN has an unfortunate fixation on Michael Crichton's supposed Gell-Mann amnesia effect (wherein you read something in the news that pertains to your field, spot errors, get angry, and then forget that happened when you go on to read the next story). I propose the countervailing Djikstra amnesia effect, wherein a technical professional produces workmanlike output with all the attendant errors and omissions that attach to any work produced by humans (Christ knows our field is intimately acquainted with errors and omissions), then forgets they did that, and expects every other professional to measure up to the standard they themselves failed to meet.