At least some heads rolled for it. But based on what I'm reading here, the problem is systemic.
The Navy inquiries determined that there had been widespread problems with leaders regarding shortfalls in training, manning and equipment in the 7th Fleet. The Navy fired admirals, captains and commanders, punished sailors and criminally prosecuted officers for neglecting their duties.
Adm. John Richardson, head of the Navy, called the two collisions “avoidable tragedies.” The ships’ commanders and their superiors, he said in a written statement to ProPublica, were responsible for the results.
“The tragedies of USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain reminded us that all commanders, from the unit level to the fleet commander, must constantly assess and manage risks and opportunities in a very complex and dynamic environment,” Richardson said. “But at the end of the day, our commanders make decisions and our sailors execute and there is an outcome — a result of that decision. The commander ‘owns’ that outcome.”
As an aside, the use of illustrations in this article are really great, from the collision graphics, to the busy sea routes.
One of the decisions not practically available to the captain is to stay in port because he declares his ship not ready.
If a crash happens, like it did, he's legally responsible and his career ends.
But if he declares his ship unfit, then he's also declaring himself unfit, because he didn't ensure that his ship was ready. And under the "operational pace" that's been described in all the articles about these incidents, you can easily imagine the unspoken order that "you will not take your ship out of service." Even though that also is his legal responsibility, if appropriate.
We've all seen or experienced "get it done, just don't tell me how you do it."
My assumption is if all ships in the 7th fleet took themselves offline until training and resources were merely acceptable, there'd be no 7th fleet.
And we're not even at effing war! At least not in the Western Pacific. Imagine the shitshow that will be a shooting war in the Western Pacific.
It's on the leadership above the captain to back him up if he declares the ship unfit - or unable to get off-ship support to make it fit. Having a culture where you can't "stop the line", to borrow a Toyota process term, for serious problems - will lead to serious problems accumulating.
This is good to hear, thank you! I'm glad that accountability for these kinds of systemic problems doesn't stop at the captain's chair.
Command negligence at very high levels, a high optempo without adequate attention to readiness and discipline.
> Based on the article it sounds like the excuse they've settled on is just blaming everything on the crew
Unless you are including the chain of command above the ship's commander up through and including the 7th Fleet commander as “the crew”, you are wrong.
The cluster of 7th Fleet incidents (the Antietam grounding and the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions) resulted in at least the dismissal of the 7th Fleet commander, the Task Force 70 commander, and the Destroyer Squadron 15 commander, and the early retirement of the head of Naval Surface Forces.