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Re:Behind the Lion Air Crash, a Trail of Decisions Kept Pilo... by twtw on Monday February 04, 2019 @11:46AM (#19077787)
For reference, here is the runaway stabilizer memory item (the "checklist") for 737:

1. Control column ............................. Hold firmly

2. Autopilot (if engaged) ..................... Disengage

3. IF the runaway stops:

------------------------ [done]

4. IF the runaway continues:

STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches (both) ...... CUTOUT

IF the runaway continues:

Stabilizer trim wheel ............ Grasp and hold

EDIT:

It's #4 that's of interest here. People saying that the interface changed are saying that it's fine if pilots stop after #1, even when dealing with runaway stabilizer for 12 minutes.

Re:Behind the Lion Air Crash, a Trail of Decisions Kept Pilo... by Someone1234 on Monday February 04, 2019 @12:03PM (#19078037)
Accurate but irrelevant. This assumes the pilots knew they were dealing with a runaway stabilizer, and considering M.C.A.S. wasn't behaving similar to their previous training/experience/simulations with Runaway Stabilizers, it isn't clear they'd know they should follow this checklist. Now had they been actually trained on M.C.A.S. inc. faults, they may have known to do exactly this and we wouldn't even be discussing it.

This has been discussed in great detail on other flight forums.

Re:Behind the Lion Air Crash, a Trail of Decisions Kept Pilo... by twtw on Monday February 04, 2019 @12:07PM (#19078095)
It's not really possible to not know that you are dealing with a runaway stabilizer. MCAS (and every other automatic system to adjust trim) causes large physical wheels at the side of the pilot's knee to spin.
Re:Behind the Lion Air Crash, a Trail of Decisions Kept Pilo... by sokoloff on Monday February 04, 2019 @12:40PM (#19078524)
And these large wheels have small bell/clackers on them so you get a distinctly audible signal in addition to the large black wheels with white stripes on them.
Re:Behind the Lion Air Crash, a Trail of Decisions Kept Pilo... by sokoloff on Monday February 04, 2019 @02:55PM (#19080013)
Here's a video of the wheels in motion: https://vimeo.com/34501723

Disregard the text on the video description as it's blatantly wrong (describing that the trim tabs still move without the wheels moving; wrong on two accounts: the trim doesn't move without the wheels moving and the 737 uses a jackscrew for horizontal stabilizer trim rather than trim tabs [which is why the pilot can't simply override the aerodynamic force as they could with a trim tab])

Jackscrew operation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxPa9A-k2xY

The 7-3 has balance tabs to make the control forces lighter in the event of a hydraulics failure, but these are not trim tabs in any sense of the word.

Re:Behind the Lion Air Crash, a Trail of Decisions Kept Pilo... by rocqua on Monday February 04, 2019 @03:55PM (#19080538)
As I read the article, it seemed like before, step 1 would suffice before. If this is not the case with MCAS, it could at the very least throw the pilot's diagnostics. "Is it runaway stabilizers? Well, no response from holding the control column firmly so I guess not. Lets check other things".

Sure, the correct response is to follow the checklist, but should we really rely on pilots always knowing the correct response? Especially when that goes against their previous experience? Not that I am defending these pilots not knowing the checklists, instead I am arguing we should take into account learning from experience rather than theory.