No. With his procedure the database would be properly configured to listen only connections from local network or localhost. So it wouldn't really be any more vulnerable than if there was a firewall protecting it.
His point in my understanding is that you should harden your servers, firewalled or not, and to hardened hosts firewall doesn't add a lot of value anymore.
In an ideal world where your OS has no vulnerabilities, your application stack has no vulnerabilities and you never make configuration errors I would agree.
However, as far as computer security goes it is very far from an ideal world.
See ghshephard's comments about "Defense in Depth" above.
Suppose you have a standard database backed website. With his procedure the database would wind up on the internet, exploitable by anyone who knows of a security flaw in it. Under standard operating procedures you'd have a firewall which the web servers are accessible to, and a second firewall that allows the web servers to connect to the database but for nobody else to. Now if someone on the internet knows of a problem in your database software, it is not easily exploitable.