If someone steals a signing key then they also need to steal the HTTPS cert. Or control the DNS records and generate a new one or switch to HTTP.
Adding an extra layer of encryption is like adding more characters on a password. Sometimes it saves your bacon, sometimes it was useless and came with performance drawbacks.
If you still disagree with me, that's fine. But I want to hear why you continue to hold this opinion when worked for 1Password during Cloudbleed.
https://blog.1password.com/three-layers-of-encryption-keeps-...
Simply put —and this is, I think, where we disagree— the signing of packages is enough. The design of Apt is such that it doesn't matter where you get your package from, it's that it matches an installed signature.
Somebody could steal the key but they would then either need access to the repo or a targeted MitM on you. Network attacks are far from impossible but by the point you're organised to also steal a signing key, hitting somebody with a wrench or a dozen other plans become a much easier vector.
The people that programmed Windows before 2003 probably didn't consider their jobs with the full national security implications.
Then you take something simple, like Linux on a simple IoT device. Say a smart electrical socket. Many of these devices went without updates for years. Doesn't seem all that bad, right? Just turn off a socket or turn it on? How bad could it be?
At some point someone noticed that they were getting targeted and and said: "But why?" The reason is simple. You turn off 100k smart sockets all at once and the change in energy load can blow out certain parts of the grid.
The point isn't that someone will get the key. The point is that we know the network is hostile. We know people lose signing keys. We know people are lazy with updates. From an economics perspective why is non-HTTPS justified? Right? A gig of data downloaded over HTTPS with modern ciphers costs about a penny for most connections in the developed world.
To me, it's worth the cost.
I do think it would cause a non-zero amount of pain to deploy though. Local (eg corporate) networks that expect to transparently cache the packages would need to move to an explicit apt proxy or face massive surge bandwidth requirements, slower updates.
That said, if you can justify the cost, there is absolutely nothing stopping you from hosting your own mirror or proxy accessible via HTTPS.
I'm not against this, I just don't see the network as the problem if somebody steals a signing key. I think there are other —albeit harder to attain— fruits like reproducible builds that offer us better enduring security. And that still doesn't account for the actions of upstream.
This is no longer secure then trusting the CA list in the preinstall Windows in pc.
If the whole PKI approach is to work, client has got to get trusting that public key right. In regular practice, that probably means checking it against a HTTPS-delivered version of same from an authoritative domain.
(How far down the rabbit hole do we go? Release managers speaking key hashes into instagram videos while holding up the day's New York Times?)
That same mechanism means you can easily make trusted mirrors on untrusted hosting.