Re:A DNS hijacking wave is targeting companies at an almost ...
by tialaramex on Saturday January 12, 2019 @07:40AM
(#18890939)
So, the validation done by all publicly trusted Certificate Authorities has to require one of the "Ten Blessed Methods". That's what they're called, though today there are exactly nine of them.
3.2.2.4.1 and 3.2.2.4.5 are now obsolete and no longer used, method 3.2.2.4.11 is basically what happened before the "Ten Blessed Methods" and so now irrelevant.
Methods 3.2.2.4.2 through 3.2.2.4.4 are about contacting somebody based on details from WHOIS by various methods, like sending them a Fax, or giving them a phone call. This is even more laughably insecure than your average DNS setup.
Method 3.2.2.4.6 is the way most people get their first Let's Encrypt cert, and is also a popular option for lots of other bulk CAs, it's about making a change to your web site that the CA can confirm. Obviously they need DNS to reach the site so that's affected.
3.2.2.4.7 puts the change into DNS directly. A better option for Let's Encrypt in most cases, and the only one of these methods that's cryptographically secure end to end (if you deploy DNSSEC).
3.2.2.4.8 turns things upside down and validates based on you having previously proved you control an IP address, then they do a DNS lookup to find that the DNS name you're asking for has an A or AAAA record with that address. This might, maybe, be a good way to get the cert for 1.1.1.1 or things like that, but I will not be astonished if this goes away.
3.2.2.4.9 instead of changing a web page you put a dummy certificate up, created by the CA (not a real cert, it's just to prove you can change the certificate).
3.2.2.4.10 is how the tls-sni-01 (now abandoned) and tls-alpn-01 (new hotness) features in Let's Encrypt work. You do TLS setup, but then you (ab)use that to prove your identity instead of actually delivering a good cert, since if you already had a good cert you wouldn't be trying to get one.
3.2.2.4.12 says basically if you're the DNS registrar AND a Certificate Authority then you can issue everybody who has names under your domain with certificates, since you know who they are.
As you can see, most of these methods depend on DNS, a few don't but are relying on something that makes DNS look like Fort Knox. 3.2.2.4.12 only sidesteps this by making your DNS registrar also your CA, so if they broke into your DNS registrar account they would still get a cert.
3.2.2.4.1 and 3.2.2.4.5 are now obsolete and no longer used, method 3.2.2.4.11 is basically what happened before the "Ten Blessed Methods" and so now irrelevant.
Methods 3.2.2.4.2 through 3.2.2.4.4 are about contacting somebody based on details from WHOIS by various methods, like sending them a Fax, or giving them a phone call. This is even more laughably insecure than your average DNS setup.
Method 3.2.2.4.6 is the way most people get their first Let's Encrypt cert, and is also a popular option for lots of other bulk CAs, it's about making a change to your web site that the CA can confirm. Obviously they need DNS to reach the site so that's affected.
3.2.2.4.7 puts the change into DNS directly. A better option for Let's Encrypt in most cases, and the only one of these methods that's cryptographically secure end to end (if you deploy DNSSEC).
3.2.2.4.8 turns things upside down and validates based on you having previously proved you control an IP address, then they do a DNS lookup to find that the DNS name you're asking for has an A or AAAA record with that address. This might, maybe, be a good way to get the cert for 1.1.1.1 or things like that, but I will not be astonished if this goes away.
3.2.2.4.9 instead of changing a web page you put a dummy certificate up, created by the CA (not a real cert, it's just to prove you can change the certificate).
3.2.2.4.10 is how the tls-sni-01 (now abandoned) and tls-alpn-01 (new hotness) features in Let's Encrypt work. You do TLS setup, but then you (ab)use that to prove your identity instead of actually delivering a good cert, since if you already had a good cert you wouldn't be trying to get one.
3.2.2.4.12 says basically if you're the DNS registrar AND a Certificate Authority then you can issue everybody who has names under your domain with certificates, since you know who they are.
As you can see, most of these methods depend on DNS, a few don't but are relying on something that makes DNS look like Fort Knox. 3.2.2.4.12 only sidesteps this by making your DNS registrar also your CA, so if they broke into your DNS registrar account they would still get a cert.