It seems most of the time that a web site is "hacked" (defaced) somebody changed the DNS instead of attacking the actual web server.
SSL signing can potentially be a second line of defense, but only if having control of the DNS (thus web and email) is insufficient to get a cert.
About 20 years ago, I remember having to go through tons of hoops to get a certificate. Faxing corporate docs and other bureaucracy. That can all be forged.
- CNAME record: pointless if your DNS is hacked
- Put a file or add a meta-tag to HTML at a specific path: pointless if your DNS is hacked, they can just add/change A/AAAA record and host their own webserver
- Email to webmaster@.. etc: pointless if your DNS is hacked, add MX record
And this is where a lot of the world is heavily behind say Estonia, Latvia (or other countries) that provide cryptographically secure signed documents tied to people, you practically can't forge those documents.
3.2.2.4.1 and 3.2.2.4.5 are now obsolete and no longer used, method 3.2.2.4.11 is basically what happened before the "Ten Blessed Methods" and so now irrelevant.
Methods 3.2.2.4.2 through 3.2.2.4.4 are about contacting somebody based on details from WHOIS by various methods, like sending them a Fax, or giving them a phone call. This is even more laughably insecure than your average DNS setup.
Method 3.2.2.4.6 is the way most people get their first Let's Encrypt cert, and is also a popular option for lots of other bulk CAs, it's about making a change to your web site that the CA can confirm. Obviously they need DNS to reach the site so that's affected.
3.2.2.4.7 puts the change into DNS directly. A better option for Let's Encrypt in most cases, and the only one of these methods that's cryptographically secure end to end (if you deploy DNSSEC).
3.2.2.4.8 turns things upside down and validates based on you having previously proved you control an IP address, then they do a DNS lookup to find that the DNS name you're asking for has an A or AAAA record with that address. This might, maybe, be a good way to get the cert for 1.1.1.1 or things like that, but I will not be astonished if this goes away.
3.2.2.4.9 instead of changing a web page you put a dummy certificate up, created by the CA (not a real cert, it's just to prove you can change the certificate).
3.2.2.4.10 is how the tls-sni-01 (now abandoned) and tls-alpn-01 (new hotness) features in Let's Encrypt work. You do TLS setup, but then you (ab)use that to prove your identity instead of actually delivering a good cert, since if you already had a good cert you wouldn't be trying to get one.
3.2.2.4.12 says basically if you're the DNS registrar AND a Certificate Authority then you can issue everybody who has names under your domain with certificates, since you know who they are.
As you can see, most of these methods depend on DNS, a few don't but are relying on something that makes DNS look like Fort Knox. 3.2.2.4.12 only sidesteps this by making your DNS registrar also your CA, so if they broke into your DNS registrar account they would still get a cert.