Also: advocating for keeping the old system by saying this new way is not different is the least Hacker News things I’ve ever heard. The student loan crisis is an existential crisis for America. More schools should adopt the Lambda School approach, America would be much better off.
The current model is no different to unscrupulous bankers selling loans to Wall Street or Fannie Mae: they just lure students to the school helping them fill out student aid and loans and then give them subpar educations with curriculum being taught like it has been for years but they don’t care to change or innovate because the school has already been paid by an entity — the US education department who has deep pockets.
And as I mentioned before, if it was too short you could declare bankruptcy, which is an option you don't have with student loans. My point that even in the worst case you're in a better position than before still looks valid.
And if they aren't, personal loans are possible. Or even bankruptcy! The common thread between these options is that they're better than being $50k in non-dischargeable debt.
[1] https://www.irs.gov/payments/payment-plans-installment-agree...
IRS liabilities can easily be repaid over long time scales, usually at much lower interest rates than you can get on unsecured loans such as a student loan.
A $50k non-dischargeable loan, at a relatively high interest rate, with a flexible repayment timeline does not appear, to me, to compare favorably with a $15k IRS liability, dischargeable in bankruptcy, at relatively low interest rates with a similarly flexible repayment timeline.
Total tuition loans outstanding is around $1.5T. Total US Education Dept annual budget, 70B. Median length to pay off student loans is around 20 years. 30% of people graduate with no debt, and of the remaining, median debt is around $30k, the cost of a decent car, and a fraction of what the same people will pay for a house.
Adding the entire Ed budget for the past 20 years is no where near the amount of loans outstanding. And in fact they lend only a fraction of their budget to student tuition.
Thus your claim that the US Ed dept is paying at the end of the day is mathematically impossible. The debt is from private lenders, who do have incentive to ensure borrowers pay back.
Not necessarily. Private banks issuing federally-backed student loans want you to default, because then they double their money. See here: http://www.collegescholarships.org/research/student-loans/
Don't exist. They used to, before 2010, though (the propagadagraphic you link obliquely alludes to that with it's reference to the “Obama changes” that it does not explain, perhaps because they render the flowchart entirely irrelevant.)
Non-federal loans account for 11% of loans: https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid/figures-tables/t....
It’s not about the payment structure alone, it’s about a school that is incentivized to make its students successful. IBR is just taxpayers swallowing the bill when schools fail.
It seems, this just provides one more payment option to students who are likely to succeed anyway and a refreshing business model for schools that move early into the space.
It doesn't address the real problem with schools i.e. making the 20th%le student successful and not a taxpayer burden.
That still sounds far better than the current system of selecting for the most popular (instead of valuable) subjects that draw in the most clueless students to get indebted for life for something they are unlikely to succeed in anyway.
> It doesn't address the real problem...
What does?
That actually sounds like a good incentive structure to me. Most people shouldn't study something that will not give them some advantage (which these schools would select for).
If you struggle to make ends meet it wouldn't be a reasonable decision to study something unprofitable in the first place. I wish it was different and everybody could invest an infinite amount of time to learn what they are interested in, but in a resource constrained reality that's not possible and individuals have to make decisions that are advantageous for them.
The remainder of the iceberg hence, will need to go to other lower parts of the pyramid. ISAs won't do anything for that. Only the government will. And the Govt does it for us, with our money, because not providing education to lower levels of pyramid will result in nothing but societal anarchy.
ISAs hence shouldn't be hailed as panacea for education loans which is what marketing makes us believe. The only advantage of ISAs, is that they unlock better education for some "motivated students" (for lack of an accurate phrase) from underprivileged circumstances. That's not a trivial advantage for those who qualify. I don't know what that % of population is, but it can't be much.
In any case, however small, that number sure seems enough to build a business around it with some feel-good marketing (like this article).
There are significant numbers showing the loan servicers engaged in fraud to prevent the forgiveness. One of the major loopholes is on an annual basis when income documents are due, the loan servicers would take extended periods to “review” the income docs and place the loans in forbearance for a month. Then when forgiveness time came they were denied for not having made payments (through no fault of their own) for 120 consecutive months essentially resetting the clock every year.
Not to mention at any given point these programs can be axed, which I’m sure they will be if there were ever a significant portion of the population who would actually qualify for the forgiveness.
So you very possibly could pay Lambda School $0.
tl;dr; on that is you borrow a certain amount (that you choose, but is capped by the program). In exchange, you pledge a certain percentage of your income every month for a certain number of months (5-10 years generally) [0]. The maximum amount you'll repay is capped at 2.5x the loan amount (i.e. if you borrow $10k, you'll repay a max of $25k).
Practically speaking, the gist of the program is that it's good for students with middle income career outlooks, but terrible for students with high income career outlooks (i.e. talented CS majors) since you'll end up paying more than a traditional loan.
[0]: The percentage pledged varies by the loaned amount and major. The number of months seemingly only varies by major. You can play with the calculator here: https://compare.vemo.com/
Purdue's program: https://www.purdue.edu/backaboiler/index.php
I don't see why this is an issue at all. If the college claims that "finding the high-income person you will marry" is one of the reasons to attend that college, then they should please return to the 1950s (or earlier!). If they DON'T, then the repayment should be based on the individual's income, regardless of their spouse's income.
Does this mean that a college risks getting paid very little by a graduate who ends up becoming a stay-at-home spouse? Sure, but that's part of the risk. A 4-year college wishing to introduce such a program can always take a less-than-complete approach and still charge some minimal tuition up front (presumably in exchange for a smaller slice of "lifetime" earnings).
When a couple marries, I think they should realize that they are to face the world together, and this means repayment of educational expenses of both partners.
A lot of people who can't pay their loans are in low-paying jobs they don't like, so this would be a very tempting option indeed.
But if the low-paying job is crummy enough, maybe you don't care about strict financial calculations...
The article doesn't really have information on the Purdue system other than saying that it might cost high-earning students 250% of the price of their education. Of course, a 30-year loan at 6% will have the borrower repaying 216% of the original amount and around $24k/year so it would only cross 10% for people earning a quarter million a year (and it doesn't generally seem bad for people earning a quarter million to pay more back).
The big issue is for universities is how they would handle marriage. For federal IBR, I believe you have to file your taxes separately. That isn't a big issue in 2018 due to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 which meant that the tax brackets for "married filing separately" are the same as "single" up to $300,000 in individual income. However, in 2017 "married filing separately" had higher taxes starting at $76k.
The federal government has a big hole in their IBR calculations in that it doesn't consider the fact that spousal income can change what another spouse might earn. But it's the federal government and they can afford to lose a bunch of money.
How would a private university with a much more limited budget handle this? Would they be happy with someone deciding to leave the job market because they married a high-earning spouse? Would they require payments based on household income?
Likewise, the article really doesn't answer how a university is going to do this. With the Lambda school, it's easy: VC. Lambda has quite low costs (their programs aren't 4 years), they only teach high-earning fields, and they have a 2-year payoff window. It's easy for them to say that their students average $70k/year and 17% of that for two years is $23,800. Likewise, the two-year payoff period means that things like marriage and leaving the job market aren't as likely.
While universities have a bunch of money, can they essentially float tuition for a decade or two? Probably not. If they could, they could have just offered loans themselves rather than having the federal government lend to students.
Plus, while the cost of university is terrible, most students don't graduate with a mountain of debt - more like a hill of debt. $22,000 is a lot of money, but a middle-income job can tackle $22,000 in debt. That's well below the cost of the average car sold in the US. More importantly, 10% of your income would likely be quite a bit more than the regular payments on a $22,000 loan. Are universities just going to use income sharing agreements to replace grants? Will students be graduating with $22,000 in loans plus an income sharing agreement to cover what the university scholarships/grants?
Generally speaking, universities in the US price themselves as, "how much can you afford to pay?" If you are receiving need-based aid and get a merit scholarship, usually your price goes up because that merit scholarship means you can afford to pay more. Is the income sharing agreement going to mean that students can afford to pay more? "I know that you can't afford more than $X today, but this agreement ensures that you pay $X and then Y% of your income after graduation." Is that the future?
One of the things that makes education financing so difficult is that steps taken to reduce student hardship can simply increase prices. If you give every university student a $10,000/year grant, every university knows that they can raise their prices by $10,000/year. The students (and families) were paying the price before given their means. If the government gives them an extra $10,000, the university knows they can ask for it with little to no options for the student. Universities can capture most or all of programs designed to help students afford them (rather than helping the students).