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Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by EugeneOZ on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:08PM (#18840293)
I'm so happy to see messenger without fucking phone number requirement. If you think your phone number can't be stolen - you don't know real things.

And in their FAQ you can find you can use phone number if you want, exactly for described purposes.

But as someone who was living in country where you can't trust your government, I can't trust messengers where phone number is a requirement.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by tass on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:36PM (#18840528)
Signal does at least allow you to require a pin which must be known in order to re-register your phone number. Does this mitigate your concern about phone numbers being stolen?

https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007059792-Re...

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by JumpCrisscross on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:44PM (#18840583)
What if I get a new number whose previous owner had registered it with Signal?
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by tass on Sunday January 06, 2019 @04:08PM (#18840723)
The lock expires after 7 days of inactivity.

If the existing user is still logged in to the Signal account with the old number, you're effectively locked out. Otherwise, you'll be able to claim the number after a week.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by em-bee on Sunday January 06, 2019 @06:36PM (#18841483)
and take over their account?
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by tass on Monday January 07, 2019 @05:59AM (#18844274)
The number is yours at that point, think of it as creating a new account with that old number.

You don’t get to know who the previous person was messaging, see their contact list or have access to any of their messages. But if they message you thinking it’s still the previous person and ignore the ‘safety number’ warning, you could potentially impersonate them.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by em-bee on Monday January 07, 2019 @06:04AM (#18844300)
the latter is what i was thinking of.

which apps detect that case and give a safety warning?

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by tass on Monday January 07, 2019 @07:16AM (#18844582)
Signal does this. It’s explained in detail at https://www.signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/.

The last section of that post specifically talks about the notification shown after a reinstall (i.e., safety number change)

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by em-bee on Monday January 07, 2019 @11:57AM (#18846931)
ok, so that's like the change of an ssh-key. i feel it's to easily ignored, yet at the same time i have no better idea how to make this more safe without being annoying. it's at least better than nothing.

also interesting what they write about the perception of finger-prints. i agree with their assessment and conclusion that using the term finger-print may confuse people because they think finger-prints should be secret. but i feel that the real problem is the public perception of what a finger-print is. we are leaving finger-prints all over the place, to they are something very very public, and not at all secret, and this the analogy of a crypto-finger-print and a real finger-print is much better than what public opinion would have us believe.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by tass on Monday January 07, 2019 @01:01PM (#18847904)
Yeah, I agree. The older versions would pop up a warning and force you to acknowledge it, but it felt like something that would have driven away casual users who maybe didn't understand or care about the implications.

In saying that, the previous behaviour can be restored (for you) but you can't force it onto users who are communicating with you.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by em-bee on Monday January 07, 2019 @09:39PM (#18852614)
what is the actual threat here? if bob looses his number either he is able to somehow change the number on his account before that happens, in which case alice will get a fingerprint change once, and then when the old number is reactivated by ted and he manages to break into bobs account and then sends a message to alice, then alice would get another finger-print change from bobs account.

assuming that she ignores the change, the failure would be noticed when bob sends another message to alice as now the finger-print would change back to bobs, marking teds as coming from a different identity. this would be detectable in the client.

unclear is how did ted get into bobs account? if bob changed the phone number. i am assuming that shouldn't even be possible, so i believe we can in fact ignore this threat.

it looks differen't though if bob can not reactivate his old account, in which case alice will connect to bobs new account, and hopefully disconnect the old one.

if ted gets the number and reactivates bobs old account then if alice did disconnect, she would notice a reconnect attempt from a new id and treat it like any new connect. if the connect verification doesn't involve the senders phone number then having bobs old number doesn't give ted any advantage.

if alice did not disconnect the old account, she will notice the account being reactivated, and now have two bobs talking to her, raising suspicion.

so it appears the only threat is coming from the case where bob looses his number and does not reconnect to alice with a new number. so alice is unaware that bob changed his number.

this can happen if bob and alice communicate rarely...

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by giancarlostoro on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:55PM (#18840653)
Guess you better contact the Signal team in that case.
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by jakubp on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:16PM (#18840360)
This is interesting, how exactly can a phone number be "stolen"? I mean a practical reality. I'm in Poland, have had the same number for >10 years with several carriers in a row, contract-based. How can anyone "steal" it / take it over?
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by monocasa on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:47PM (#18840605)
SS7 is horribly secured, and you can pretty easily forge that signaling information.

For the past couple years here in the US, scammers have been calling with stolen numbers that match your prefix more than a random caller probably would. So for ABC-DEF-GHIJ all of ABC-DEF matching is a pretty good sign it's a spammer if you live in a large metropolitan area. Unfortunately it makes them nearly impossible to track back, because when you call the number back, it's some random private number that didn't even make the call and has no idea what you're talking about. I've had a couple very angry people call me and yell to stop trying to sell them credit cards.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by jakubp on Monday January 07, 2019 @11:16AM (#18846408)
I don't fully follow the prefix thing. So a scammer makes a call from a number that's a prefix of my number? That doesn't affect 2FA, that won't show up as "me" on my friends' phone screens when they call, etc... how is that an issue?
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by monocasa on Monday January 07, 2019 @12:03PM (#18847038)
The scammer is able to forge the signaling and routing. It's not that they have numbers for your prefix, they're just able to connect to SS7, know that they're calling 555-111-2222, and forge the signaling information for say 555-111-3333 hoping that you're more likely to pick up the phone, and you have no way to call them back as they'll not be associated with that number once the call is done.

> That doesn't affect 2FA

You can use the same techniques to say "I am 555-111-2222, route all sms for that number to me".

> that won't show up as "me" on my friends' phone screens when they call

They absolutely can do that.

It's not that they bought numbers in each of the prefixes, it's that they're forging the signaling information for another number in your prefix dynamically, based on your number.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by jakubp on Tuesday January 08, 2019 @03:26AM (#18854155)
Thanks :)
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by rawfan on Sunday January 06, 2019 @04:53PM (#18840964)
As another commenter pointed out, the mobile network signaling system sucks. You can just read other peoples SMS by becoming part of the SS7 network. It's that easy. Watch these two talks on the subject:

https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6249_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271...

https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6122_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271...

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by jakubp on Monday January 07, 2019 @11:18AM (#18846427)
I can't follow this, it's too technical for me. Are you saying anyone here on HN who watches the talk (and is technical enough) could just read text messages of the people who are in the area around their BTS? How is that NOT done en masse then?
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by EugeneOZ on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:25PM (#18840442)
For starters, you can copy sim card, entirely.

About practice - one of Telegram users was comprised using his phone number, because russian government just ordered to mobile operator to do this. It was much more simple than copying sim card :)

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by jakubp on Monday January 07, 2019 @11:15AM (#18846395)
Right. So if you need physical access to my phone to be able to copy my keycard, I'm not too worried. I'll find out very quickly I don't have it, within minutes typically (hours at most). If someone is an incredibly smart adversary, steals my phone, gets the SIM card, copies it, and gives it back without me noticing, I'm f*ed anyway.

Or is there a way to copy SIM card remotely???

As for state-level adversary, I get it. I'm even less concerned here :)

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by EugeneOZ on Saturday January 12, 2019 @12:43PM (#18892303)
Physical access is not needed.
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by schoen on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:27PM (#18840451)
I think it depends on the carrier and the adversary. For example, a government could ask the carrier to give them a copy of traffic to your number, or to cancel your number, or to let them send data as you.

This is already "practical" if you have a capable enough adversary; for example, there have been reports of attackers subverting SMS-based 2FA.

https://www.google.com/search?q=attacks+on+sms+2fa

This could be based on cooperation of the carrier, or perhaps SS7 attacks, or IMSI catchers.

Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by geofft on Sunday January 06, 2019 @03:51PM (#18840628)
One common scam in the US is to walk into a retail store, say that you lost your phone, ask for a replacement SIM card, and trick the minimum-wage employee into giving it to you (fake IDs, yelling, whatever).
Re:Threema – Seriously secure messaging by em-bee on Sunday January 06, 2019 @06:39PM (#18841495)
if you loose your simcard, or it expires for some orhe reason, it will eventually be reassiged. then someone else has your old number and may recover your old account if you weren't able to change the number on it.