Having a charging-only-by-default port would be a 90% solution, but would be very annoying for people who need to reauthorize a device every time they plug it in, which is why I think pairing is better. And I'm not sure what devices you can reasonably trust other than pure power. HID is definitely out for fear of Rubber Ducky-style attacks. External video adapters can read your screen. Headphones can listen in on calls. Thumbdrives / PTP devices might be safe if handled carefully but are kind of the classic worry, so I'm not sure if people will want those. Maybe pure U2F devices, webcams, and audio input devices? Not sure how useful or user-friendly such a restriction would be.
If it tries to present another HID later, that would result in a new prompt, the same as a brand new device. If it changes HID while plugged in, that could even be a more severe message along the lines of "Hey, this keyboard just tried to become a video adapter and thumb drive, that's really suspicious and you should probably destroy it with fire".
Likewise, VID/PID changing without being unplugged/replugged in, changing too quickly, or even just after too many new VID/PIDs in a short time period should result in a temporary lockdown -- in the same way fail2ban blocks repeated login attempts from a given IP.
One of the primary drivers for this is the power delivery - imagine a scenario where you have authentic power brick and laptop and buy a counterfeit USB-PD cable, power brick sends 100W over it and it results in the cable melting since it was really a $5 knock-off and you end up with a fried USB-C port in your laptop and possibly a fire. I'm sure most people would wish that the power-brick/laptop checked that cable is genuine and build to handle the power.
Why not implement something like detecting voltage drop between charger and device? Short circuit detection, etc. You can do a lot if you can have both sides communicate with each other, and at that point it matters a whole lot less if your cable lies to you plus you catch a lot of other failure conditions.
The OTG device is required to limit the current it draws from the ACA such that VBUS_OTG remains above Vaca_opr min.
Not a USB engineer, but a quick peek at the BC 1.2 spec suggests the ball would have to be dropped on at least two additional fronts for the suggested failure mode to occur:
1.) The Charging Port device vendor for failing to implement any of the allowed shutdown measures suggested in BC1.2 §4.1.4; and
2.) the Downstream Port device vendor for failing to constrain current draw based on sensed Vaca_opr min = 4.1V (Table V) per ibid. §§6.2.2 and 6.3.1.
I can see how the knock-off cable would be toast, and depending on insulation rating, may potentially catch fire, but struggle to see how either the CP or DP USB-C ports would fry (considering they're both designed for a target power).
It would still allow someone to bypass the authentication if they know the VID and PID of something already authorized with the desired HID class, but that seems reasonable and is significantly better than what we have today.
Are there any systems that work like this today, and if not, is there a reason?
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/USB_human_interface_device_c...