They suspended almost immediately the public key common to the 750 000 flawed cards, disabling them, and they issued an update a few months later. That seems like a pretty good reaction. I don't see what they could have done better, apart from making the cards themselves.

1) are the private keys in Belgian eID's also similarily not randomly generated on-chip, and in whose hands does this happen?

2) if we face the same issue as Estonia, why is no one in Belgium discussing this?

3) if Belgium is not affected, why is Gemalto having 2 systems? doesn't it seem more efficient to use the same private key generation mechanism for both customer nations? why would Gemalto go out of its way to have separate codebases etc regarding "on chip" private key generation? this all seems to suggest that Belgium too is similarily affected

Nothing about this flaw in the local news afaik.

These eIDs are replaced every few years, so it still matters to a lot of people.

How do we expect "deviants" to improve if we don't even allow feedback towards the "deviant" ?