There is no such practical network which remains such a network for long. All networks must be assumed to be byzantine as they certainly will be compromised at some point, if they're not already.
A valid conclusion might indeed be to stop them being accessible from the outside, by installing such server boards in a network-topologically secure location such as a landfill.
This isn't a fair assessment of the situation. Networks that aren't entirely trusted and controlled can cause spectacular failures. By knowing this, administrators can use BMCs safely. My Poweredge server even came with a warning sticker that had to be removed before the DRAC port could be used.
In general, tools can have "pointy parts" with which the user could harm themselves so long as the risks and proper uses are documented and explained adequately.
There's your problem.
It’s a pretty common configuration.
I know of at least 2 places where this is still the case (that or a remote IP KVM...).
The BMC should be on a trusted network, but most likely isn't.
After it left the factory. But can't the firmware be installed by someone while the board is in the testing phase?
> > The rogue instructions, Bloomberg reported, caused the BMCs to download malicious code from attacker-controlled computers and have it executed by the server’s operating system.
It's using the fact that the BMC has unfettered access to the rest of the machine to compromise the code running on the server itself. That's valuable even if the BMC itself is on a private network inaccessible to the attacker.