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Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by auslander on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @09:07AM (#18184451)
> solves a problem nobody really cares about

DNSSEC was designed to protect from using forged or manipulated DNS data. Including all other records, like TXT, MX, CERT records, SSH fingerprints, IPSec public keys and TLS Trust Anchors.

I care that I can verify all this.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tialaramex on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @10:38AM (#18185242)
And being verifiable this means we don't need to care about how it gets transported to clients, which is a recurring theme in Internet design.

The TLS WG has a piece of work for how you shove the DNSSEC RRs into a TLS setup, so you can say "OK, I know DNSSEC but my resolver sucks, so, can you prove who you are with DNSSEC?" as an alternative to doing the Web PKI or some similar setup but with a private CA.

For example we saw this previously with OCSP in two ways: Firstly, any issuer working at scale does OCSP by pre-generating answers and shoving them into an ordinary CDN / reverse cache. The CA knows they issued cert X, and it was still good on Friday, they sign an OCSP response that says "I'm the issuer, cert X was still good as of today" dated Friday and they shove that into the cache. Now the CDN can deliver OCSP responses quickly and at scale without scattering OCSP signer keys all over the Internet. Clients can trust them because they're signed, even though the client talked to some CDN, not the issuer at all.

Secondly OCSP stapling. Instead of clients doing OCSP (and most often failing open since it's unreliable) let's have the server collect OCSP responses for its certificates periodically, and then "staple" the response to the certificate when delivering it. The OCSP signer and OCSP client never communicate at all, but since it's a signed message the client can trust that it's genuine.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @09:41AM (#18184719)
You're one of the few. And I can't imagine why anyone would want to enroll their personal keys --- SSH, IPSEC, whatever --- into a global PKI. Your VPNs and SSH connections are more secure, objectively, outside of DNSSEC.
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by phicoh on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @09:57AM (#18184863)
Only if you have an out-of-band way of verifying SSH keys. In my experience, 9 out of 10 times that doesn't happen and people just accept a changed SSH key.
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @03:11PM (#18187956)
So fuck it, let's let the United States Government cast the tiebreaking votes when we're not sure?
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by Leace on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @09:59AM (#18184887)
To add to that, new protocols are designed not to rely on DNSSEC: MTA-STS for MX records (uses HTTPS), Web Key Directory for OpenPGP keys (uses HTTPS).

Even old GnuPG deprecates DNS based key lookup: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-October/0...

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by phicoh on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @11:48AM (#18186004)
Putting user keys in DNS is an obvious mistake: deeply connected to DNS is the idea that the data in DNS is public. It requires heroic attempts like NSEC3 to keep data private and even NSEC3 is not enough. Trying to put list of users (mail addresses) in DNS is a mistake.

That said, the only reason for MTA-STS seems to be that some people don't like DNSSEC. From RFC 8461 "Related Technologies The DNS-Based Authentication of a Named Entities (DANE) TLSA record [RFC7672] is similar, in that DANE is also designed to upgrade unauthenticated encryption or plaintext transmission into authenticated, downgrade-resistant encrypted transmission. DANE requires DNSSEC [RFC4033] for authentication; the mechanism described here instead relies on certification authorities (CAs) and does not require DNSSEC, at a cost of risking malicious downgrades."

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @03:09PM (#18187943)
When you say "some people don't like DNSSEC", you're sort of dancing around the fact that the people who don't like it are some of the most important organizations on the Internet; to wit: all the major mail providers.
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by phicoh on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @03:24PM (#18188039)
Which is fine. Do I really care about the security of Gmail? Yahoo? Hotmail?

For me the important thing is that all TLDs I care about support DNSSEC. So I can implement DNSSEC-based security locally. If other people want to play a different game, it is mostly fine with me.

The only annoying part is that browsers refuse to do DANE validation but firefox somehow is very quick to jump on the DoH bandwagon.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @04:58PM (#18188816)
I don't know. Do you ever email people? If so: yes, you do.

It doesn't really matter that you can configure your own little island of DNSSEC since you'll inevitably depend on one of the resources in, like, the whole rest of the Internet, virtually none of which signs zones with DNSSEC. This really all is just security theater.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by phicoh on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @07:18PM (#18189798)
I assume that when you say 'virtually none', you are aware that more than 50% of the dot-nl domains (so around 3 million) are DNSSEC signed. Furthermore, more 60% of the DNS queries that reach the servers for the dot-nl zone are from validating resolvers.
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @09:49PM (#18190492)
I do not care about the thousands of European domains that are signed because domain hosting firms automatically enable it and sign zones for their customers, and neither should you, since that is obviously security theater.

In the unlikely event that anyone is reading the thread this deeply, you can go to https://dnssec-name-and-shame.com and try to find a big tech firm other than Cloudflare (which has a DNSSEC product) and (heh) Comcast that uses it.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by phicoh on Thursday October 11, 2018 @07:46AM (#18192654)
It is important, because it is very important to have production traffic.

If you live in a centralised internet then what those big parties do is important.

I don't care what version of SSH any of those big parties are running.

Many services have a decentralised version. And when you really care about security, it is worth setting up local servers instead of hoping that those big parties really give you the service you need.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Thursday October 11, 2018 @12:11PM (#18194712)
I flat-out don't understand what argument you're trying to make here. My response to your claim that DNSSEC is widespread because of signed .NL domains was simple: that's because registrars in .NL do that for zones automatically, holding the keys themselves. That's simply theater.
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by auslander on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @10:06AM (#18184939)
Not sure. Malicious ISP can forge DNS answers [0], the purpose of DNSSEC is to catch that.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking#Manipulation_by_...

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tptacek on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @10:20AM (#18185063)
False. DoH, DNS over TLS, and DNSCrypt/DNSCurve address that problem. DNSSEC does not.
Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by phicoh on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @10:06AM (#18184944)
One of the nice things about DNSSEC is that it is both optional and it actually works.

It being optional means that everybody who doesn't like DNSSEC can just ignore it. Just don't sign your zones, don't run a validating resolver. DNSSEC doesn't get in the way.

At the same time, because Google's public resolvers have been validating DNSSEC for quite a long time, it is safe to run a validating resolver. Anybody who signs a zone is forced to do it correctly, otherwise the zone will be unreachable for a significant fraction of the people on the the internet.

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by auslander on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @10:12AM (#18184995)
> Google's public resolvers have been validating DNSSEC for quite a long time

Quad9 also provides DNSSEC validation on our primary resolvers. Better for you privacy :)

Re:Despite proposed solutions, DNS security issues remain by tedunangst on Wednesday October 10, 2018 @10:47AM (#18185353)
But you don't care at all about confidentiality?