That said, the only reason for MTA-STS seems to be that some people don't like DNSSEC. From RFC 8461 "Related Technologies The DNS-Based Authentication of a Named Entities (DANE) TLSA record [RFC7672] is similar, in that DANE is also designed to upgrade unauthenticated encryption or plaintext transmission into authenticated, downgrade-resistant encrypted transmission. DANE requires DNSSEC [RFC4033] for authentication; the mechanism described here instead relies on certification authorities (CAs) and does not require DNSSEC, at a cost of risking malicious downgrades."
For me the important thing is that all TLDs I care about support DNSSEC. So I can implement DNSSEC-based security locally. If other people want to play a different game, it is mostly fine with me.
The only annoying part is that browsers refuse to do DANE validation but firefox somehow is very quick to jump on the DoH bandwagon.
It doesn't really matter that you can configure your own little island of DNSSEC since you'll inevitably depend on one of the resources in, like, the whole rest of the Internet, virtually none of which signs zones with DNSSEC. This really all is just security theater.
In the unlikely event that anyone is reading the thread this deeply, you can go to https://dnssec-name-and-shame.com and try to find a big tech firm other than Cloudflare (which has a DNSSEC product) and (heh) Comcast that uses it.
If you live in a centralised internet then what those big parties do is important.
I don't care what version of SSH any of those big parties are running.
Many services have a decentralised version. And when you really care about security, it is worth setting up local servers instead of hoping that those big parties really give you the service you need.
Even old GnuPG deprecates DNS based key lookup: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-October/0...