Even with a chain of trust, what is to stop someone desoldering the storage chip off my device and reading the data and bruteforcing that way?
I had a long think while writing this reply about different ways of stopping the issue you described of "change[ing] the OS to simply ask for your passcode and send it back to that someone, you won't notice it", and I couldn't think of one that would be entirely secure (eg. encrypting system, extra checks for this part of the OS) so I agree there - however:
- There are 100s of millions (billions?) of PCs that start and do not have a chain of trust or SecureBoot that store much more confidential information than who my mother last called.
- Lots of servers that store confidential information do not have a chain of trust or SecureBoot.
- SecureBoot is vulnerable.
- Users who get a little popup when starting their phone would likely just ignore it. (if you disagree with this then you severely overestimate the average phone user)
- The chain of trust becomes completely worthless after I decide to put a new operating system on my device. This limits my choice and freedoms as a user of a device.
“what is to stop someone desoldering the storage chip off my device and reading the data and bruteforcing that way?” - the key will be 128-bit, not bruteforcable in the next hundred years. The TEE contains that key, and can only be unlocked by giving it your user password, online.
The remainder of your arguments seem to be “well it’s not perfect, so why bother?” Servers don’t get left on the subway or stolen. Modern PCs mostly do have forms of secure boot. I can’t speak for Android ecosystem, but users won’t get a popup on iPhone, a modded firmware will just not let the phone boot.
I see your point about bruteforcing that key, however I was more talking about bruteforcing the password.
Servers have been stolen in the past, and I am not just talking about a big rack server here.
In Android, all you tend to get is an unlock symbol on the bootloader logo, or a warning triangle.
With the desoldering the chip to read the data off, you’ll get an encrypted blob which is encrypted with a securely random 128-bit key, so it’s impossible to crack. the Key and the users password are embedded inside the TEE and cannot be read out - the TEE only provides an interface where you can supply a candidate password, and if you get it correct it’ll provide you the 128-bit key to decrypt your data. It has an internal delay and counter, and will destroy the key if you get the password wrong X number of times.
So I’m not sure how you might go about being able to brute force the password, given you can only brute-force online, which is slow and will only give you a small number of attacks.
> - The chain of trust becomes completely worthless after I decide to put a new operating system on my device. This limits my choice and freedoms as a user of a device.
Actually, no. If you just want to replace the operating system, you're good to go. Modern android phones display the public key of the kernel when booting a non-OEM ROM and bootloader has been re-locked. (granted, pretty much noone does that)
It doesn't matter how good your encryption or password is if I can change your bootloader to have a program steal that password or read the encryption key out of memory.
See some of the thunderstrike attacks for examples of what a compromised bootloader can do.
In general, it's funny how security bods sometimes worry about attackers modifying the hardware when the attacker could achieve the same thing more easily by completely replacing the hardware.
(Is that really your phone that you just entered your passcode into, or is it an identical phone modified so as to transmit the passcode to the thief who just substituted one for the other?)
A good thing, IMHO.
"Insecurity is freedom."
"Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither."
I’m sure most people are prepared to give up the freedom of easy access to their house in order to require access with a key, as a fair trade off of security.
That isn't the case with these locked-down systems.
First, full-device encryption is much weaker if you can do offline bruteforce. With a secure boot trust of chain, it is online, and is rate-limited by the TEE (and could be made to destroy after too many tries) Even better, per Android documentation, full-device encryption key is tied to boot public key. So if someone flashes another OS, even if you enter the passphrase, noone will access your data.
Also, with a PC, if someone replaces your PC, and changes the OS to simply ask for your passcode and send it back to that someone, you won't notice it. With a proper boot chain of trust (which PCs don't have, except for Librem BIOS), it is evident that the OS has been changed, so you know not to give this device your passcode.
Also, boot chain of trust makes it harder to do cold-boot attacks.
So globally, having a chain of trust, is much more secure for full-device encryption, because it forces online bruteforce. Considering that usually passwords used on smartphones are much more weaker (many people have 6 digits for their smartphone, vs 10 characters on their computers), the added security seem necessary to me.