Philosophy 1: Move to hardware SSH keys. That's what Y4s and Nitrokeys represent: keys where, if your machine is compromised, the SSH key itself can't easily be stolen.
Philosophy 2: Move to SSH CAs that issue short-lived certificates, and use U2F to authenticate issuance. This is roughly how you'd do a modern integration of an SSO system (like Okta or GSuite) with your SSH services.
SSH CAs have more steam behind them, and are desirable for a bunch of reasons that hardware SSH keys don't really address.
Since the primary function (beyond U2F, which these keys don't do) of a hardware key is to protect your SSH key, I guess it's worth considering how they fit into the modern SSH worldview or whatever you want to call it.
U2F is "just" a hardware P-256 key (or a set of keys unique to origin, but ignoring privacy issues they are comparable, of course I'm assuming the same setup so touch-to-use set to required).
(I've set up SSH CAs manually and I'm familiar with low level U2F for that matter).
The thread is actually better than the linked post because it tells you about ways you can (relatively easily) set up systems without long-term ssh keys.