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Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by timvdalen on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @10:19AM (#17959914)
Hah, that page actually allows you to test whether or not a certain email address is signed up for the service, which seems like an even worse idea given what they're to become.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by kazagistar on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @10:43AM (#17960132)
How do you actually prevent this? It seems impossible to prevent that information from leaking via timing attack.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by kodablah on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @02:00PM (#17961920)
You should validate credentials all at the same time. In general, you only fail a login at the end of the process, not halfway through. Also every login failure, regardless of reason, should be accompanied by short, random server-side sleep before returning (e.g. random between a couple hundred milliseconds and a second).
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by AmericanChopper on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @03:50PM (#17962726)
Account enumeration is impossible to fully prevent, and as far as security vulnerabilities go, the risks associated with account enumeration are usually pretty irrelevant. It’s the sort of thing you’d see on a penetrating testing report when the testers didn’t find any actual security vulnerabilities.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by JimDabell on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @06:11PM (#17963856)
I generally agree with that, but it's worth mentioning that there are exceptions where being able to tell if an individual is registered can be sensitive information (Ashley Madison, Grindr, etc.)
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by AmericanChopper on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @08:08PM (#17964548)
Yeah, there are some unique threat models where determining that an account exists would be a sensitive information disclosure. In those cases users would be more willing to endure the potentially heavy handed UX trade offs required to adequately prevent it.

It’s the idea that knowing that an account exists somehow represents a compromise in the accounts security posture that I generally reject.

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by menacingly on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @02:25PM (#17962109)
I still think that's vulnerable to timing attack. Timing attacks are the voodoo that should keep us up at night, a clever attacker can extract information that seems impossible.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by xvector on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @03:24PM (#17962505)
With unlimited logins, it is indeed vulnerable to timing attacks. You could measure the mean time of a certain email against the mean time of another email. This effectively gets rid of the random delay.

Perhaps you could measure the time of the login process and adjust the random delay based on how long the process has taken. If you can get this to average to a <1ms difference between the "email exists" and "email doesn't exist" you could probably defeat any timing attacks over the network.

That, or just limit retries and have different random timeouts for every login. Now you can't try enough times to get a good estimate of the mean for each login path, and you can't use other logins to help you refine your estimate because each has different timeouts.

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by thaumaturgy on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @07:48PM (#17964424)
Once upon a time I thought this was a pretty serious avenue of attack and wrote login forms to always run on the server in constant time -- starting a timer at the beginning and only returning output after a fixed number of ms.

I mostly don't bother anymore, because an effective timing attack for account discovery against something that's doing everything else correctly should take so many attempts that it should wake up whatever brute force protection sites should be running now anyway.

Given the number of dumb automated brute force probes against just about anything with a login, you can't just allow an infinite number of requests from a single IP (or a handful of IPs).

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by menacingly on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @10:35PM (#17965184)
Oh sure, didn't mean to come across as someone who worries deeply over account discovery. I just saw an opportunity to remind folks that foiling side-channel attacks is very non-trivial and you can put forth a good effort and still be surprised at the information you're leaking.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by count on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @05:10PM (#17963396)
Random sleeping isn't super effective. See: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1129.pdf and it's references.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by kodablah on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @05:44PM (#17963651)
From what I read, they can tell differences when having the randomness in the hundredths-of-seconds (specifically said they patched to go from 10s to 10,000µs). The randomness I mention, assuming N is the maximum number of tolerable system time for successful login, should be 2N + random(2N, ~100N). Or just store a time at login start and force hit the same deadline every time (via sleep of diff from start) then add randomness on top. Of course, additional brute force detection/protection is ideal for repeated failures.

The random sleep is to prevent obtaining enough samples and provide reasonable noise at this small sample size. Given enough samples until the end of time, patterns can be obtained. This is not breaking TLS here, this is login, and seconds of sleep vs microseconds makes a difference.

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by count on Thursday September 13, 2018 @10:23PM (#17984287)
Randomness inserted like that can be filtered out statistically with a decent sample set - it's a gaussian distribution, so you'll still see the saying timing differences. This is why things have to be constant time, rather than random return time.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by jedberg on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @12:56PM (#17961405)
Usually you do it by giving the same response for an invalid password and a non-existent email. I wanted to see how that particular page was leaking but the site wouldn’t load for me.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by RcouF1uZ4gsC on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @01:20PM (#17961598)
That won’t really help in general because you can go try to sign up with an email address. It has to tell you if the address is already taken or not.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by insomniacity on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @01:48PM (#17961819)
Not quite - best practice is to continue the initial setup - ie, "we've sent you a link, please click to activate your account". Except if the email address is already in use, you email the address and let them know that. That way they only leak that info to the owner of the email address - and they can include a password reset link too.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by MattSayar on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @02:01PM (#17961927)
How about for websites that give you some functionality without a verified email address? At that point, you can't let a user dink around if the address is in use.

Granted, this doesn't apply to eg banks, but there's plenty of websites where this could apply.

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by JimDabell on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @06:08PM (#17963835)
Don't ask for their email address then. What's the point in having an email address that you have no idea if it's correct or not? You might as well ask them to put in a random string of characters.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by 0x6c6f6c on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @01:24PM (#17961636)
Absolutely. It's really more relevant with services you can't directly sign up for, such as an internal service in the company where user enumeration helps you find a target when the error messages are different.
Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by dasil003 on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @10:54AM (#17960251)
Requiring a timing attack and having throttling on any such endpoints raises the bar quite a bit by itself.

As to preventing timing attacks you can add a delay to give a uniform response time.

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by CiPHPerCoder on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @11:15AM (#17960474)
> As to preventing timing attacks you can add a delay to give a uniform response time.

You have to be very careful with how you implement the delay to prevent the timing signal from still propagating to the attacker.

https://blog.ircmaxell.com/2014/11/its-all-about-time.html#A...

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by paulddraper on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @11:39AM (#17960695)
What the vulnerability?

You find out that an email address belongs to a Swiss citizen?

Re:The Effectiveness of Publicly Shaming Bad Security by jstarfish on Tuesday September 11, 2018 @07:29PM (#17964338)
No, but given a list of random addresses of Swiss citizens scraped from wherever, you can validate each one by checking them against this portal. If it shows up, it's an active address.