> in fact, there are virtually no such prosecutions
> Telling the truth about defects in technology isn't illegal.
These statements don't seem to add up. If it's legal to tell about defects, then all of EFF's work (on this case) is a waste of time and they're spreading misinformation.
If it's legal to do what they're doing then there should be zero prosecutions.
Companies wouldn't need to authorize anyone because what they are doing is legal.
Edit: added some clarification
Yes. I think EFF often does mislead people. They do some important work, and some less well-intentioned advocacy stuff.
I supported my argument with evidence. To wit: if what researchers do is "illegal", consider this year's Black Hat schedule, and ask why none of these presentations generated so much as a C&D, let alone a threatened criminal prosecution: MDM attacks, attacks on self-driving cars (including Tesla’s ECU), breaks in “16 desktop applications, 29 websites, and 34 mobile applications” in the fintech space, attacks on ATMs, industrial control gateways, VPNs, ICS firewall products, antivirus software, “Akamai, Varnish Cache, Squid Proxy, Fastly, IBM WebSphere, Oracle WebLogic, F5”, a smartphone baseband, every macOS firewall product, mobile point of sales systems including “Square, SumUp, iZettle, and Paypal”, SAML SSO’s, SATCOM, WinVote voting machines, LTE base stations, z/OS for Christ's sake, streaming video watermarking schemes, “a cross-section of smart city devices currently in use today", Toshiba FlashAir SD cards, warning siren systems from ATI Systems, celllular devices manufactured by Sierra Wireless and many others, implanted medical devices, text-to-speech systems, and a hardware backdoor in an x86 clone.
What prosecutions would you put on the other side of this scale to balance it out? It sounds like the best argument the thread has seen so far is Aurenheimer, who dumped a database and bragged to the media about his "theft". I don't support that prosecution and didn't at the time, but if that's the best evidence you've got, I'm not going to be up nights worrying about this.
I work in this field. Cory Doctorow's relation to it is that of a gadfly. I'm saying outright: I think this article is misleading.
You'll have no trouble finding vulnerability researchers to take the other side of my argument, that we're all a threatened species ready to be pushed underground at any moment by overzealous prosecutors. We've been saying that for literally decades, and I think it has more to do with us wanting to feel exceptional and daring than it does with any real risks we face.
There are people who have legit legal issues with the research that they're doing. They fall generally into two buckets:
* The rapidly shrinking bucket of people doing content protection security research for vendors that don't want copy protection stuff broken (and related stuff, like jailbreaking consoles).
* People who are testing other people's computers, not their own.
Most of the legal drama you see in our field comes from that second group. I fully agree: it is legally dangerous to test software running on a stranger's computer without authorization. But most important vuln research doesn't set off that particular tripwire.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16642155
(This is about the Zack Whittaker story referenced on the thread, not about Dropbox's VDP, which is the ostensible subject of the thread).
Again: these are the good examples.
In the 5 months since, I haven't see more legal drama for vuln research (again, despite multiple huge conferences with people dropping zero-day on litigious vendors on stage). Where is the evidence that this is a real problem?
(I couldn't help it, I got nerdsniped, but the case is also under seal and none of the documents available are interesting).
I think you're right that companies and prosecutors are generally tolerant of security researchers doing their thing.
But I also think the EFF is right that dangerous tools exist that can be misused by overzealous or malicious prosecutors.
I think that's the part the EFF is concerned about. At least the CFAA part.
The EFF also discussed the DMCA, but I'm not familiar with any cases of security researchers prosecuted under that law.
Can you expand on why you think some of EFF's advocacy is less well-intentioned?
There isn't an epidemic of prosecutions of vulnerability researchers --- in fact, there are virtually no such prosecutions, despite 8-10 conferences worth of well-publicized independent security teardowns of everything from payroll systems to automotive ECUs. There are so many random real-world things getting torn down by researchers that Black Hat USA (the industry's biggest vuln research conference) had to make a whole separate track to capture all the stunt hacking. I can't remember the last time someone was even C&D'd off of giving a talk.
I'm a vulnerability researcher (I've been doing that work professionally since the mid-1990s) I've been threatened legally several times, but all of them occurred more than 8 years ago. It has never been better or easier to be a vulnerability researcher.
Telling the truth about defects in technology isn't illegal.
Doctorow has no actual connection to the field, just a sort of EFF-style rooting interest in it. I'm glad he approves of the work I do, but he's not someone who I'd look to for information about what's threatening us. I'm trying think of something that might be a threat... credentialism, maybe? That's the best I can come up with. Everything is easier today, more tools are available, things are cheaper, more technical knowledge is public; there are challenges in other parts of the tech industry, but vuln research, not so much.