News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by pas on Saturday August 11, 2018 @08:47AM (#17739470)
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by hacknat on Saturday August 11, 2018 @09:44AM (#17739639)
Encrypted SNI probably can’t make this version, as it requires a fair bit of new protocol infrastructure to support. The handshake would have to start with a generalized untrusted assymetric exchange exchange to transfer the SNI field then “upgrade” the connection to be trusted and then retroactively tell the client what the initial “untrusted” key was so that the client can confirm it didn’t suffer a man in the middle attack during the SNI transfer phase.

All of this is possible and should be done, but I doubt it will make protocol 3.

Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @11:30AM (#17740029)
As far as I know, the SNI field is only used by the server to select what cert to use and site to serve. So if someone were to MitM the SNI exchange, presuming they don't have a valid cert, they could only cause the client to receive a different site (if served with a cert valid for both sites). We can presume the MitM doesn't have a valid cert, otherwise they could fully MitM the connection.

To ensure your keys are indeed set up by the trusted party, you need to get that signed by the server cert, but that is already part of the TLS protocol. It seems I'm missing something.

Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by stanleydrew on Saturday August 11, 2018 @12:20PM (#17740267)
The danger is not that unencrypted SNI exposes clients to additional MitM attacks. It just exposes the client's intended domain to everyone on the connection route. It's an information leak, that's all.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @01:57PM (#17740749)
I think OP I replied to stated that encrypting SNI requires MitM mitigations.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by hacknat on Sunday August 12, 2018 @09:40AM (#17744302)
Everyone on the connection route would be “in the middle”. The actors to watch out for are ISPs and CDNs.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @12:29PM (#17740315)
It is sad to see the SNI encryption isn't in TLS 1.3. I'd say that unencrypted SNI is the single biggest issue with TLS 1.2; it is a very obvious leak of information. All of the improvements in TLS 1.3 are nice-to-haves, but they are mostly shoring up systems that are already pretty secure, whilst we leave the largest leak open.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by tialaramex on Saturday August 11, 2018 @07:46PM (#17742148)
In prior TLS versions the server certificate is sent unencrypted. So a passive eavesdropper gets not just the name but a certificate for that name from the server. This is fixed in TLS 1.3
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @10:32AM (#17739809)
I only skimmed the RFC, but it seems like the SNI can be send either in the extensions in the client hello, or later in the encrypted extensions.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @11:22AM (#17739989)
Never mind, apparently encrypted extensions is only sent by the server to the client, not the other way around.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by nashvillecactus on Saturday August 11, 2018 @11:27AM (#17740015)
I think you got it right the first time, server_name is referring to SNI in this context: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-37

Specifying which extensions are encrypted is part of the ClientHello. Encrypted Extensions are supposed to be sent directly after the client receives ServerHello.

With that said, I don't think we'll see implementations of encrypted SNI in the wild any time soon. From the ietf draft on encrypted SNI:

DISCLAIMER: This is very early a work-in-progress design and has not yet seen significant (or really any) security analysis. It should not be used as a basis for building production systems.

Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @11:36AM (#17740071)
That table is what I based my first post on. However, as far as I can find out, Encrypted Extensions are only ever send by the server to the client. [1]

The SNI that most people care about encrypting are those sent from the user to the server.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-120

Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by nashvillecactus on Saturday August 11, 2018 @11:54AM (#17740151)
Okay, I see what you mean. Apparently I need to read more, because that completely flies in the face of how I thought this whole thing worked.