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Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @11:30AM (#17740029)
As far as I know, the SNI field is only used by the server to select what cert to use and site to serve. So if someone were to MitM the SNI exchange, presuming they don't have a valid cert, they could only cause the client to receive a different site (if served with a cert valid for both sites). We can presume the MitM doesn't have a valid cert, otherwise they could fully MitM the connection.

To ensure your keys are indeed set up by the trusted party, you need to get that signed by the server cert, but that is already part of the TLS protocol. It seems I'm missing something.

Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by stanleydrew on Saturday August 11, 2018 @12:20PM (#17740267)
The danger is not that unencrypted SNI exposes clients to additional MitM attacks. It just exposes the client's intended domain to everyone on the connection route. It's an information leak, that's all.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by rocqua on Saturday August 11, 2018 @01:57PM (#17740749)
I think OP I replied to stated that encrypting SNI requires MitM mitigations.
Re:The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 by hacknat on Sunday August 12, 2018 @09:40AM (#17744302)
Everyone on the connection route would be “in the middle”. The actors to watch out for are ISPs and CDNs.