Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
by lvh on Friday August 03, 2018 @09:11PM
(#17684836)
You're right that shitty systems train users to be phishable -- by typing their password all over the place -- all the time, not even counting the poor default password hygiene most users have. This is one of the reasons U2F/WebAuthn is so incredibly valuable.
Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
by angry_octet on Saturday August 04, 2018 @12:21PM
(#17687418)
Agree, SSO failures train people to type their domain password everywhere. Also used for proxy login, sent out via SMBv1 etc.
A jumpbox with 2FA might be workable. Servers only accept logins from the jumpboxes, but you don't have to get 2FA working on them. Essentially it's an internal VPN gateway. (Be on the lookout for the knobheads in IT that set up parallel login mechanisms without 2FA, like mounting the file share, virtual desktop logins from the hypervisor, Kerberos auth.)
Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
by amaccuish on Friday August 03, 2018 @09:30PM
(#17684893)
I love SAML (not the XML part), it gives me one place where I can concentrate. My SSO first tries kerberos (if they've logged into their Windows machine using AD), x509 for smartcards, and if all that fails, username+password+totp. Password login is blocked without a TOTP token provisioned. Also it's one place I can stick fail2ban rules.
Though it might work with a second, more limited (not-so-)SSO system for specific users and environments.