Not to mention that there is no conclusive evidence of the dual process theory yet, see for example this experimental study finding that logical "type 2" answers are actually typically faster and that intuitive "type 1" answers are typically also logical:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001002771...

> Not to mention that there is no conclusive evidence of the dual process theory yet

Define "conclusive". There is considerable evidence for this dual reasoning mode.

As for your study, system 1 thinking is not inherently illogical. In fact, it's necessarily logical otherwise it would be maladaptive. The point is that it's logical in a "lossy" way that sometimes excludes pertinent information for speed of response, and so sometimes goes wildly wrong.

Yes, I know what you mean. In my opinion, the connection to the System 1 / System 2 theories did not add much depth to the paper. I think the intended purpose was to bolster the argument that both learners and solvers (operating in different ways) are both useful forms of intelligence. However, this point can be made in other ways as well.

In any case, I look forward to more scholarship and experimentation at the intersection of these topics.

I'm curious to know what your definition of "actually thinking" is. I suspect your argument is circular.

All definitions of things get circular at some point. What defines a chair? The set of criteria you come up with to divide chairs from other things has to invariably turn in on itself, as the hilarious exercise to define a sandwich illustrates. All identity is ultimately an illusion.

In other words, the more division you create in the world, the more 'specialness' you create. And in the immortal words of Syndrome, when everyone's special, no one is.

With a fine enough definition of thought, anything can fit the definition.

>I attended this talk at IJCAI, and I must say that the whole system 1 / system 2 analogy rubbed me the wrong way.

It immediately rubs me in the wrong way because dual process theories of the brain are wrong and outmoded and need to die out of the public consciousness now!

I am muttering angrily in cognitive science!

What's the current theory in vogue?

Bayesian brain theories are more "in vogue", along with various other theories saying that the brain does some forms of statistical and causal learning and inference.

Sure, that seems reasonable. But I don't see why statistical and causal learning and inference really preclude the evolution of a system 1/2 dualism.

They don't preclude it, but they didn't happen to include it in our particular history. In particular, in the evolutionary history of the brain as an energy-optimizing controller of the body, a "System 1" would have been selected against extremely early on, when it directed the internal organs to act according to "heuristics" that wasted calories.

> In particular, in the evolutionary history of the brain as an energy-optimizing controller of the body, a "System 1" would have been selected against extremely early on, when it directed the internal organs to act according to "heuristics" that wasted calories.

How are the calories are wasted exactly? Our hind brain triggers autonomous reactions to various inputs. Clearly not all such reactions are adaptive, sometimes staying very still and bearing some pain or discomfort is better than death. And so we evolved higher level cognitive faculties to make better choices, just a little slower than the hind brain. This is system 1.

I don't see why the exact same pressures couldn't work at this cognitive level as well. System 1 provided more adaptive reactions to a wider range of situations, but just a little slower than the hind brain. But even still, some metacognitive faculty would yield even better reactions in some circumstances, and so we evolved system 2.

But system 1 still has tremendous significance, because it's much better than our hind brain, is sufficient for most daily scenarios, and is not as calorically expensive as system 2.

The logic behind the efficiency gains is similar to the cache hierarchy in computers. We have more than one cache level because 2-3 cache levels is pretty close to optimal when trading off density, thermal considerations, and efficiency.

>How are the calories are wasted exactly? Our hind brain triggers autonomous reactions to various inputs. Clearly not all such reactions are adaptive, sometimes staying very still and bearing some pain or discomfort is better than death. And so we evolved higher level cognitive faculties to make better choices, just a little slower than the hind brain. This is system 1.

This story is false. The autonomic system isn't autonomous from the rest of the brain: its parameters, "set trajectories", are regulated by the rest of the brain (meaning: the limbic areas of the cortex), while the hypothalamus communicates with the endocrine system to predict and control the body from that angle. As you already say, a truly reactive body-regulator would get you killed very quickly.

Regulating the body by anticipating what it has to do is The Point of a brain. Further, the brain has six intrinsic networks to its functional connectivity, not two modular systems.

There's just no empirical evidence for a dual-process model. There's empirical evidence for an embodied predictive-control model. If you want to arrange this into "layers" from "animalistic" to "human", the way to do it would be to section off the particular cognitive functions which, at times, can be used for offline simulation of the environment, as a mode of metabolic reinvestment of surpluses.

> There's just no empirical evidence for a dual-process model.

I'm not sure the consensus is as strong as you imply:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_process_theory#Evidence

https://scottbarrykaufman.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/dua...

I don't see any direct, empirical neuroscientific evidence in that "Evidence" tab. Unfortunately, many psychology experiments allow you to fit any remotely reasonable theory to the data.

So then you'd agree that there is as much empirical evidence for a dual process model as there is for many other models. This seems a little broader than your original claim that there is "just no empirical evidence for a dual process model", which suggests that there is evidence for a more realistic model which should be preferred.

>So then you'd agree that there is as much empirical evidence for a dual process model as there is for many other models.

No, because a dual process model spreads itself too thin: it doesn't coherently explain many experiments with a single theory, but instead rewrites the theory for every distinct experiment.

I just wanted to let you know I really appreciated your calm and above all clear method of refuting what I saw as the core problem in my brain modeling classes (years ago). I never got past the "you're just making this up aren't you" stage, being countered with "no we are not but we also can't explain why".

Thank you, very much! I used to be absurdly terrible at this and get into absurd internet arguments, so I've been trying to speak more like my neuro adviser when I have to discuss the subject. She says she still gets heaps of pushback when she tries to speak against "brains are made of modular blobs" theories, in no small part thanks to plain sexism.