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Re:Getting Started with DNS over HTTPS on Firefox by tialaramex on Friday July 20, 2018 @06:42PM (#17579588)
> DNSSEC, to a degree, stands in the way of a better solution.

When no such "better solution" exists this is wishful thinking, we might make the same argument for any number of core systems and protocols.

In particular you've offered no evidence whatsoever that a system could be developed (much less _has_ been developed and thus offers a viable alternative) which avoids "blindly" trusting authoritative answers from name owners about their names...

Historically the rationale for why we can't do DNSSEC on clients is that it won't work because of middleboxes. The present topic is of course about deliberately altering clients so as to bypass middleboxes and so actually this is a world where DNSSEC works much _better_ than ever before.

Re:Getting Started with DNS over HTTPS on Firefox by tptacek on Saturday July 21, 2018 @10:12AM (#17582040)
This doesn't make any sense. First, it's plainly obvious that we could design replacements for essentially any protocol. Second, the fundamental design problems that would motivate and be corrected in a new DNSSEC are obvious:

* Offline signers was a mistake, since virtually all leaf authority servers are online signers due to the NSEC debacle.

* A protocol with less than 20% saturation in 2018 that expects to be deployed would be based on a modern signature scheme, not RSA.

Just altering those two elements of the design would allow for a radically improved protocol.

I'm 41 years old. The DNSSEC design being promoted right now was started when I was still in high school, during the phlogiston era of cryptographic protocol design. It is lunacy to believe that it is the best thing we can come up with.