Re:Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th,...
by mattbierner on Thursday July 12, 2018 @11:45PM
(#17520387)
A log of network requests made on install would be a valuable start. Even if it doesn’t reveal anything actively hostile, I imagine there’s plenty of telemetry servers getting pinged and probably some http going on (both of which the package may also do at runtime but that’s a whole other problem)
Re:Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th,...
by thenewwazoo on Thursday July 12, 2018 @08:34PM
(#17519715)
FYI, I've downloaded all package versions uploaded between 2018-07-12T09:49:24.957Z and 2018-07-12T12:30:00Z (first compromised eslint package upload and key invalidation time), and got no hits for your signature strings in them.
Re:Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th,...
by rpearl on Thursday July 12, 2018 @08:35PM
(#17519720)
key invalidation time was 2018-07-12 18:42 UTC
How did you produce this list btw?
Re:Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th,...
by thenewwazoo on Thursday July 12, 2018 @08:41PM
(#17519749)
I'm still not totally clear on that, btw - they claim they invalidated keys created before 2018-07-12T12:30:00Z, but they did it at 2018-07-12 18:42 UTC. I can't decide if that's problematic.
I downloaded the contents of the npm couchdb and did an exhaustive search of version timestamps.
Re:Postmortem for Malicious Packages Published on July 12th,...
by rpearl on Thursday July 12, 2018 @11:42PM
(#17520378)
they invalidated keys based on when the attack became non-functional (due to the pastebin getting removed at 12:27 UTC). But the window in which any packages could potentially have been similarly compromised is from the point the attacker had access to tokens through the point they were invalidated.
We've created a GitHub repo to track our progress that you can visit here: https://github.com/runkitdev/eslint-scope-scan
We will immediately file issues on any packages we find the exploit in. We are also open to suggestions to more sophisticated further approaches after this initial scan. Additionally, we are internally working on adding some sanity checks to the installation pipeline that might one day catch this sooner (such as monitoring network requests and file modifications during our sandbox install). Please let us know if you have any other ideas.