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Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by Dylan16807 on Thursday September 30, 2010 @12:03PM (#1743704)
Letting people see each individual device, even firewalled, is a security downside.
Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by moxiemk1 on Thursday September 30, 2010 @02:12PM (#1744219)
Obfuscation isn't security. If exposing the existence of a device is compromising to you, then this doesn't solve the problem, it makes it less likely.

To which you might say "it makes us less likely to be compromised", which is probably your goal. So obfuscating network access probably makes sense to you. But I think it's dishonest to market this as "security". The door is still exactly as open as it would be if they were exposed. Security is fixing the problems that would be exploited

Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by ay on Thursday September 30, 2010 @07:28PM (#1745296)
http://www.out-law.com/page-11052

It is marginally more difficult than IP addresses.

So, unless you are truly using a multiuser machine from which the users use the Internet, it's just a convenient feeling of security. Which in itself does have some value, though, even if merely to save from some stress.

Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by loup-vaillant on Thursday September 30, 2010 @12:09PM (#1743731)
I don't believe you. I'm willing to listen though. Do you have a link to a detailed, technical explanation of this?
Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by Dylan16807 on Thursday September 30, 2010 @12:54PM (#1743921)
I need a reference that exposing more information about systems that are nearly guaranteed to have security flaws is bad? I'll give you a simple scenario and then go look for something to make you happy.

I have a computer running services A and B and several computers running service B. Service A exposes information about the computer's configuration that helps attack service B, but only if the attacker can figure out which one.

Edit: I haven't really been able to find a comparison between firewalling and firewalling+NAT, just comparisons between nothing and NAT.

Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by loup-vaillant on Thursday September 30, 2010 @04:38PM (#1744736)
By the way, I wasn't completely explicit. I supposed that in both cases all incoming ports are closed, except for the ones you explicitly open. That way, the only difference between the NAT and the firewall is the address translation.

My scenario is narrow, but I expect it to be a common one: IPv6 internet boxes will likely include such a firewall by default.

Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by bmelton on Thursday September 30, 2010 @02:06PM (#1744198)
I have to agree with Dylan on this one. By default, the security of a system with ANY public addressability (vs. one that can't be seen except on outbound requests) is dramatically less secure than not exposing it at all.

If we can believe the old adage that "The only secure server is one encased in concrete", then the average non-NATTED device is more akin to one that is concreted than one with public addressability.

Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by loup-vaillant on Thursday September 30, 2010 @04:46PM (#1744773)
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1744736 (I supposed that going from NAT to clean firewall would open any incoming ports.)
Re:There is no Plan B: why the IPv4-to-IPv6 transition will ... by loup-vaillant on Friday October 01, 2010 @02:54AM (#1746275)
Errata: wouldn't open any incoming port.