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Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by Nokinside on Sunday June 24, 2018 @06:51AM (#17385986)
If a virus can cause accident that releases radiation, it's not a computer safety problem, it's a failure in nuclear plant automation design.

Modern nuclear plant's usually have analog monitoring and safety system's parallel to digitized control in critical parts like neutron flux measurement and calibration, fuel loading monitoring, control rod position indicator, control rod actuators, .... Any error caused by virus attempting sabotage the plant should result shutdown.

You can divide the system into 1) process automation 2) limiting systems and 3) Protection systems.

Process automation can be fully digitized and computerized. If it fails or computer virus attempts to sabotage the system, it should not cause critical conditions because limiting systems have diversified digital and analog control systems that limit given parameters. If that fails independent protections systems trigger shutdown if those same parameters are exceeded.

Another way to divide the safety is four principles:

1) parallel principle: parallel subsystems

2) separation principle: parallel subsystems are placed so that simultaneous damage to all of them is very unlikely.

3) diversity principle: same function is implemented with different operating principles. The same valve can be operated using electric motor, compressed air, or manually.

4) safe-state principle: system failing falls back to the safe state

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by roywiggins on Sunday June 24, 2018 @07:10AM (#17386041)
A shutdown is still a denial of service attack, which might be bad enough on its own. How well can the grid compensate for one or several plants suddenly dropping offline? We know cascading grid failures can happen.

But, I guess the risks there are about the same for a nuclear plant as they would be for a computerized non-nuclear plant.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by topspin on Sunday June 24, 2018 @07:37AM (#17386123)
> How well can the grid compensate for one or several plants suddenly dropping offline?

One? Pretty well usually. Reactor trips are common enough that the grid is designed to handle it. If multiple reactors shut down simultaneously the loss of supply could exceed available margins and disrupt service.

Here is the most recent (June 6th, BRAIDWOOD) full power trip reported in the US: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/...

There was another last week but it was only from 2% power at the time. We see a couple every month and few ever notice.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by Nokinside on Sunday June 24, 2018 @08:16AM (#17386248)
This is a unique new category for networked digital automation that is absent from other systems. I don't think computer security people take it seriously enough.

Say, you sabotage "dumb" automation system to break and turn the car suddenly right. When the failures starts to happen, manufacturer eventually notices it and recalls vehicles. Maybe tens or hundreds of people will be injured.

But what if the system has access to date and time trough CAN bus? If design a system that steers all affected cars suddenly right at the same time the cascade can kill and injure thousands and cause huge panic. People are afraid to drive until the problem is fixed.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by nickpsecurity on Sunday June 24, 2018 @11:54AM (#17386976)
High-assurance security has been pushing separation kernels to solve that kind of problem for a long time. Vendors even list automotive in their Solutions menus. Two got evaluated by NSA for security. I think NSA cancelled that protection profile because the hardware and firmware were having too many leaks to find a software solution believable. The boards aimed at that market are also increasingly complex. However, the separation kernels and virtualization platforms were the strongest thing produced for this goal with some still available.

Here's a good explanation of default, architectural style used in high-assurance security from a team that FOSS's a lot of their prototypes:

https://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/papers_ps/nizza.pdf

Here's a commercial one used in an automotive platform that got certified to high assurance at EAL6+:

https://www.ghs.com/products/safety_critical/integrity-do-17...

I'm not endorsing the [closed-source] product so much as the methods it claimed to use to get the job done. Look at the architecture, minimalist runtimes (esp for Ada), determinism, partitioning, and certification data on bottom-right. That last part hints at the kinds of things they have to do and get reviewed for the certification. If a developer claims to do security, ask to see the Covert, Channel Analysis of their product. That certification requirement/activity is how cache-based, timing channels were discovered in 1992 by VAX Security Kernel team among other leaks. Covert and side channels are getting popular again but most still don't apply storage/timing analysis.

You'll find that most developers and "security professionals" don't build secure stuff using methods proven to work in the past. Companies building tech like this sell it for high price since there's so few buyers. The networking-oriented ones started at $50,000 when I priced them. You can bet the big companies whose products are getting hit could've afforded them, though. Especially the royalty-free options.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by Nokinside on Sunday June 24, 2018 @02:02PM (#17387545)
Partitioning kernels have been used decades in aviation and other safety critical systems. I have developed software for integrity for example. It's commercial software and not proper open source, but the code is available for their their customers.

These system address the issue of separating different functions as well as possible. What they don't address the problems that widely used homogeneous systems face when a way to compromise the system is found.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by nickpsecurity on Sunday June 24, 2018 @03:37PM (#17388015)
I first encountered them made for aerospace for DO-178B. What's the oldest one you know like a separation kernel whose design details are publicly described? I like giving proper credit and knowing the history.

For me, we went from security kernels to Rushby's concept to separation kernels. Then, they did aerospace versioms first since safety requirements were already a subset of security requirements. Plus, aerospace companies would actually buy it. Hard to sell that stuff in non-regulated markets.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by Nokinside on Monday June 25, 2018 @09:24AM (#17392191)
I'm not good at history of operating systems.

Separation kernel is efficiency thing. The oldest and most secure way to solve the same problem is separate computers and put data diodes between them if necessary. Need for integrated modular avionics was the driving force for the development. Aircraft have space and weight limits.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by irundebian on Tuesday June 26, 2018 @02:26PM (#17402924)
> If a developer claims to do security, ask to see the Covert, Channel Analysis of their product. > You'll find that most developers and "security professionals" don't build secure stuff using methods proven to work in the past.

Could you tell which security professionals actually offering such in depth analysis? I have the feeling that most penetration tests or security assessments offered aren't that deep, rather mostly of low-quality. Could you also tell how the NSA is doing their security evaluations exactly? I know there is Common Criteria, but these documents are so high-level that you can't derive the techniques on how to conduct thorough evaluations.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by nickpsecurity on Friday June 29, 2018 @12:32AM (#17422436)
Almost none. Most people in the security industry don't use techniques like that which proved out in older evaluations. My own framework for looking at things was heavily based on those methods. Common Criteria got too political where people might try to dodge requirements with hand-waiving. So, I'll give you that plus the VAX Retrospective since the design, layering, and assurance sections show you what methods were in use in 1990's high-assurance security. Also, the covert channel analysis was how they found cache-based, timing channels in it in 1992. Mainstream security ignored that for a long time, too. Most still don't give them credit. It's a social or clique thing that I can tell.

http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Karger-et-al-A...

https://pastebin.com/y3PufJ0V

For covert channels, you want to look up Kemmerer's Shared Resource Matrix for storage channels and Wray's method for timing channels. Those got early results. There's a lot of newer ones under banner of "information flow security." Google variations of those terms with "PDF" since they're PDF's to find lots of answers. Throw the word "survey" in with information flow since I think there was a survey paper.

Finally, I'll throw in below my summary of assurance techniques I found over time:

https://pastebin.com/uyNfvqcp

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by irundebian on Wednesday July 11, 2018 @08:23AM (#17506287)
Thank you very much! You're pastebin were really interesting to read.
Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by fulafel on Sunday June 24, 2018 @08:17AM (#17386252)
A plant dropping offline is still a relatively friendly and controlled event. In a malicious case you could imagine a plant acting in a maximally adverserial way to the grid's direction.
Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by erentz on Sunday June 24, 2018 @02:52PM (#17387800)
Back during SQL Slammer (IIRC) I was working in security and subsequently SCADA security for critical infrastructure. There was a well known story about a nuclear plant in the US that had its network taken down by the worm. The problem was they had become so reliant on automation that only had two operators on duty, not nearly enough.

The lesson too often ignored I quickly found all over in the critical infrastructure space was, yes, the software is terribly insecure, but more critically when all is well organizations develop an overreliance on automation always going well meaning they’re under equipped for when it stops going well.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by archgoon on Sunday June 24, 2018 @03:39PM (#17388021)
Is this the incident?

https://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767

'The Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours, despite a belief by plant personnel that the network was protected by a firewall, SecurityFocus has learned.

The breach did not pose a safety hazard. The troubled plant had been offline since February, 2002, when workers discovered a 6-by-5-inch hole in the plant's reactor head. Moreover, the monitoring system, called a Safety Parameter Display System, had a redundant analog backup that was unaffected by the worm. But at least one expert says the case illustrates a growing cybersecurity problem in the nuclear power industry, where interconnection between plant and corporate networks is becoming more common, and is permitted by federal safety regulations.'

Sounds like the plant was being operated by a skeleton crew since it was mostly disabled.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by erentz on Sunday June 24, 2018 @04:57PM (#17388349)
That could be it but that sounds much less concerning than how the guy at INL who was telling me about it described it. He may have enhanced the story. :-)
Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by fulafel on Sunday June 24, 2018 @08:03AM (#17386215)
Do you have a reference to sources or requirements documents saying that the plants must tolerate a malicious actor in control of the computerized parts of a plant, control rooms and supporting infrastructue? This sounds like quite a hard problem to solve.

Safety, meaning defense against accidental events, is in some respects much easier than defense against malicious events. Diversity and redundancy for example are much less effective: failure comes, not from a coincidence of two very unlikely failures, but from the adversary just successfully attacking an additional subsystem in a workflow of several attacks.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by Nokinside on Sunday June 24, 2018 @09:15AM (#17386421)
Diversity and parallel principles are more general than cybersecurity. If these the design is properly implemented, complete failure in one subsystem (even intentional) is not going to cause a catastrophe. All the attacker can do is to trigger controlled shutdown from analog subsystems.

Different countries have different safety requirements for nuclear power plants, all plants are not necessarily equally secure. Safety is expensive to implement and manufacturers provide different choices.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by fulafel on Sunday June 24, 2018 @09:25AM (#17386460)
I'm sure we agree but a caveat like "if properly implemented" is quite a big one to make in this business - bad stuff happens largely because of implementation bugs. And we don't know how to eliminate implementation bugs. And this is one reason why we see successful attacks on systems with multiple "sound if properly implemented" levels of security.
Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by moring on Sunday June 24, 2018 @10:13AM (#17386626)
I remember reading elsewhere that bad stuff happens largely because of incomplete or conflicting requirements, and that implementation bugs are secondary. My own experience confirms this, even though I usually deal with systems where a problem at worst results in lost sales / orders and thus sloppy coding and implementation bugs are much more common.

Makes me wonder how well-polished the requirements analysis for (nuclear) power plant software is...

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by Nokinside on Sunday June 24, 2018 @11:01AM (#17386795)
There is no perfect security. What I mean is that if you design a plant in a way that it's not relying on cybersecurity measures or digital automation for it's nuclear safety and security, it's secure from cyberattacks.
Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by adrianN on Sunday June 24, 2018 @09:51AM (#17386552)
We know how to eliminate almost all implementation bugs. I hope nuclear power plants are one of the areas where people are willing to pay for that level of correctness.
Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by blablabla123 on Sunday June 24, 2018 @09:49AM (#17386546)
It's nice that they have all these principles. And they are not only there for digital systems but literally anything created by engineers in the Nuclear Power Plants. Still there have been accidents. Paradoxically Chernobyl was caused by human fault by the Operators. Possibly it might not have happened if there had been digital systems in place for direct control of the nuclear processes.

IMHO Nuclear technology is inherently insecure and every attempt to make it "secure" is just a hack. I mean if you just compare what best practices there are in security, like openness especially when it comes to incidents. So many incidents came out through detours and sometimes only after years.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by cjslep on Sunday June 24, 2018 @12:05PM (#17387028)
> I mean if you just compare what best practices there are in security, like openness especially when it comes to incidents. So many incidents came out through detours and sometimes only after years.

You're going to have to be specific about claims like this, because this comes across as FUD in the US given the stringent transparency requirements the NRC holds licensees accountable.

To see current events: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/...

Edit: Also your argument about the failure of Chernobyl is not compelling as you provide no evidence of how the existing analog systems failed in a way that digital systems would not leading to an an aversion of the accident. It is generally accepted that it was a combination of [lack of] system redundancy (analog or digital does not matter), inherent risk with the beta reactor design coefficient, and poor operator understanding of the neutron poison buildup from the low power excursion.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by blablabla123 on Monday June 25, 2018 @06:32AM (#17391261)
Chernobyl was discovered through measurements by western states, not by disclosure. In fact worse happened for accidents that happened in the west. Even in the recent years, just read about them, no need to reference.

It's not "my argument" but you can read it for instance on Wikipedia.

I'm aware that the official requirements are stringent but that means not much I'm afraid.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by cjslep on Monday June 25, 2018 @06:50AM (#17391331)
> Even in the recent years, just read about them, no need to reference.

I have studied lots of nuclear accidents because I studied Nuclear Engineering. While Fukushima was happening, for that matter. Telling me to "read up" and "no need to reference" comes off as extremely intellectually lazy at best and condescending at worst.

> It's not "my argument" but you can read it for instance on Wikipedia.

If it isn't your argument then why bother even bringing it up, except to spread FUD? I'm not going to seek out something you don't even care to advocate for. I will stick to my primary sources within the industry.

> I'm aware that the official requirements are stringent but that means not much I'm afraid.

I am glad you are self-describedly aware. But your (lack of) argument and vague handwaving generalization is not compelling me to reach the same conclusion. I've met a lot of anti-nuclear proponents who have made much more informed arguments, and I respect them, but I don't have much patience for vague "read Wikipedia" "arguments". Either stand for something, or please stop spreading FUD.

Re:German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, oper... by blablabla123 on Tuesday June 26, 2018 @01:46PM (#17402632)
I have studied Physics and been member of ecological groups. So let's say I have a viable interest.

So you need references, here you go. Obviously this is going to take some minutes to google:

- Chernobyl: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster#Delayed_ann...

- 3 Mile Island: "Twenty-eight hours after the accident began, William Scranton III, the lieutenant governor, appeared at a news briefing to say that Metropolitan Edison, the plant's owner, had assured the state that "everything is under control".[58] Later that day, Scranton changed his statement, saying that the situation was "more complex than the company first led us to believe."[58] There were conflicting statements about radioactivity releases.[" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident#Vol...

Fukushima might have had a more direct communication to the media. But it puzzles me how long it took to accept help from foreign countries... did they actually ever?

I think the core problem about this discussion is that you have on the one side really left ecological group and on the other Nuclear industry, engineers. Both groups are perceived as very biased by each other, sometimes with reason, sometimes irrational. In any case there aren't so many topics there the depth of argumentation sometimes goes into ridiculous depths. Sometimes arguments themselves sound very ridiculous because it seems to counter-intuitive. It's already 10 years ago that I betted with someone from a neoliberal party a box of beer that there were Nuclear transports you could throw an egg on and it got baked. It took me hours to find that stupid article - from a reputable German news magazine. Of course he didn't admit that I won, he just stopped answering my mails.

Honestly, this is making no sense.