But, I guess the risks there are about the same for a nuclear plant as they would be for a computerized non-nuclear plant.
One? Pretty well usually. Reactor trips are common enough that the grid is designed to handle it. If multiple reactors shut down simultaneously the loss of supply could exceed available margins and disrupt service.
Here is the most recent (June 6th, BRAIDWOOD) full power trip reported in the US: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/...
There was another last week but it was only from 2% power at the time. We see a couple every month and few ever notice.
Say, you sabotage "dumb" automation system to break and turn the car suddenly right. When the failures starts to happen, manufacturer eventually notices it and recalls vehicles. Maybe tens or hundreds of people will be injured.
But what if the system has access to date and time trough CAN bus? If design a system that steers all affected cars suddenly right at the same time the cascade can kill and injure thousands and cause huge panic. People are afraid to drive until the problem is fixed.
Here's a good explanation of default, architectural style used in high-assurance security from a team that FOSS's a lot of their prototypes:
https://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/papers_ps/nizza.pdf
Here's a commercial one used in an automotive platform that got certified to high assurance at EAL6+:
https://www.ghs.com/products/safety_critical/integrity-do-17...
I'm not endorsing the [closed-source] product so much as the methods it claimed to use to get the job done. Look at the architecture, minimalist runtimes (esp for Ada), determinism, partitioning, and certification data on bottom-right. That last part hints at the kinds of things they have to do and get reviewed for the certification. If a developer claims to do security, ask to see the Covert, Channel Analysis of their product. That certification requirement/activity is how cache-based, timing channels were discovered in 1992 by VAX Security Kernel team among other leaks. Covert and side channels are getting popular again but most still don't apply storage/timing analysis.
You'll find that most developers and "security professionals" don't build secure stuff using methods proven to work in the past. Companies building tech like this sell it for high price since there's so few buyers. The networking-oriented ones started at $50,000 when I priced them. You can bet the big companies whose products are getting hit could've afforded them, though. Especially the royalty-free options.
These system address the issue of separating different functions as well as possible. What they don't address the problems that widely used homogeneous systems face when a way to compromise the system is found.
For me, we went from security kernels to Rushby's concept to separation kernels. Then, they did aerospace versioms first since safety requirements were already a subset of security requirements. Plus, aerospace companies would actually buy it. Hard to sell that stuff in non-regulated markets.
Separation kernel is efficiency thing. The oldest and most secure way to solve the same problem is separate computers and put data diodes between them if necessary. Need for integrated modular avionics was the driving force for the development. Aircraft have space and weight limits.
Could you tell which security professionals actually offering such in depth analysis? I have the feeling that most penetration tests or security assessments offered aren't that deep, rather mostly of low-quality. Could you also tell how the NSA is doing their security evaluations exactly? I know there is Common Criteria, but these documents are so high-level that you can't derive the techniques on how to conduct thorough evaluations.
http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Karger-et-al-A...
For covert channels, you want to look up Kemmerer's Shared Resource Matrix for storage channels and Wray's method for timing channels. Those got early results. There's a lot of newer ones under banner of "information flow security." Google variations of those terms with "PDF" since they're PDF's to find lots of answers. Throw the word "survey" in with information flow since I think there was a survey paper.
Finally, I'll throw in below my summary of assurance techniques I found over time:
The lesson too often ignored I quickly found all over in the critical infrastructure space was, yes, the software is terribly insecure, but more critically when all is well organizations develop an overreliance on automation always going well meaning they’re under equipped for when it stops going well.
https://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767
'The Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours, despite a belief by plant personnel that the network was protected by a firewall, SecurityFocus has learned.
The breach did not pose a safety hazard. The troubled plant had been offline since February, 2002, when workers discovered a 6-by-5-inch hole in the plant's reactor head. Moreover, the monitoring system, called a Safety Parameter Display System, had a redundant analog backup that was unaffected by the worm. But at least one expert says the case illustrates a growing cybersecurity problem in the nuclear power industry, where interconnection between plant and corporate networks is becoming more common, and is permitted by federal safety regulations.'
Sounds like the plant was being operated by a skeleton crew since it was mostly disabled.
Safety, meaning defense against accidental events, is in some respects much easier than defense against malicious events. Diversity and redundancy for example are much less effective: failure comes, not from a coincidence of two very unlikely failures, but from the adversary just successfully attacking an additional subsystem in a workflow of several attacks.
Different countries have different safety requirements for nuclear power plants, all plants are not necessarily equally secure. Safety is expensive to implement and manufacturers provide different choices.
Makes me wonder how well-polished the requirements analysis for (nuclear) power plant software is...
IMHO Nuclear technology is inherently insecure and every attempt to make it "secure" is just a hack. I mean if you just compare what best practices there are in security, like openness especially when it comes to incidents. So many incidents came out through detours and sometimes only after years.
You're going to have to be specific about claims like this, because this comes across as FUD in the US given the stringent transparency requirements the NRC holds licensees accountable.
To see current events: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/...
Edit: Also your argument about the failure of Chernobyl is not compelling as you provide no evidence of how the existing analog systems failed in a way that digital systems would not leading to an an aversion of the accident. It is generally accepted that it was a combination of [lack of] system redundancy (analog or digital does not matter), inherent risk with the beta reactor design coefficient, and poor operator understanding of the neutron poison buildup from the low power excursion.
It's not "my argument" but you can read it for instance on Wikipedia.
I'm aware that the official requirements are stringent but that means not much I'm afraid.
I have studied lots of nuclear accidents because I studied Nuclear Engineering. While Fukushima was happening, for that matter. Telling me to "read up" and "no need to reference" comes off as extremely intellectually lazy at best and condescending at worst.
> It's not "my argument" but you can read it for instance on Wikipedia.
If it isn't your argument then why bother even bringing it up, except to spread FUD? I'm not going to seek out something you don't even care to advocate for. I will stick to my primary sources within the industry.
> I'm aware that the official requirements are stringent but that means not much I'm afraid.
I am glad you are self-describedly aware. But your (lack of) argument and vague handwaving generalization is not compelling me to reach the same conclusion. I've met a lot of anti-nuclear proponents who have made much more informed arguments, and I respect them, but I don't have much patience for vague "read Wikipedia" "arguments". Either stand for something, or please stop spreading FUD.
So you need references, here you go. Obviously this is going to take some minutes to google:
- Chernobyl: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster#Delayed_ann...
- 3 Mile Island: "Twenty-eight hours after the accident began, William Scranton III, the lieutenant governor, appeared at a news briefing to say that Metropolitan Edison, the plant's owner, had assured the state that "everything is under control".[58] Later that day, Scranton changed his statement, saying that the situation was "more complex than the company first led us to believe."[58] There were conflicting statements about radioactivity releases.[" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident#Vol...
Fukushima might have had a more direct communication to the media. But it puzzles me how long it took to accept help from foreign countries... did they actually ever?
I think the core problem about this discussion is that you have on the one side really left ecological group and on the other Nuclear industry, engineers. Both groups are perceived as very biased by each other, sometimes with reason, sometimes irrational. In any case there aren't so many topics there the depth of argumentation sometimes goes into ridiculous depths. Sometimes arguments themselves sound very ridiculous because it seems to counter-intuitive. It's already 10 years ago that I betted with someone from a neoliberal party a box of beer that there were Nuclear transports you could throw an egg on and it got baked. It took me hours to find that stupid article - from a reputable German news magazine. Of course he didn't admit that I won, he just stopped answering my mails.
Honestly, this is making no sense.
Modern nuclear plant's usually have analog monitoring and safety system's parallel to digitized control in critical parts like neutron flux measurement and calibration, fuel loading monitoring, control rod position indicator, control rod actuators, .... Any error caused by virus attempting sabotage the plant should result shutdown.
You can divide the system into 1) process automation 2) limiting systems and 3) Protection systems.
Process automation can be fully digitized and computerized. If it fails or computer virus attempts to sabotage the system, it should not cause critical conditions because limiting systems have diversified digital and analog control systems that limit given parameters. If that fails independent protections systems trigger shutdown if those same parameters are exceeded.
Another way to divide the safety is four principles:
1) parallel principle: parallel subsystems
2) separation principle: parallel subsystems are placed so that simultaneous damage to all of them is very unlikely.
3) diversity principle: same function is implemented with different operating principles. The same valve can be operated using electric motor, compressed air, or manually.
4) safe-state principle: system failing falls back to the safe state