Re:Keybase Exploding Messages
by cascom on Wednesday June 20, 2018 @02:24PM
(#17358136)
anyone care to expand on the practical applications/implications/threat model where this makes sense?
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It's for when you trust someone but don't want to risk either your or their device being compromised in the future. For instance:
- if your or their phone gets taken at a border crossing
- if your or their phone gets taken by the FBI (which is how they recovered encrypted WhatsApp/Signal chats from Michael Cohen's phone)
- etc
Re:Keybase Exploding Messages
by ProblemFactory on Thursday June 21, 2018 @08:14AM
(#17364371)
Or in a much simpler and common case: you trust someone right now to run a non-modified client and not to take screenshots, for example based on a corporate policy.
Months later the relationship turns sour, and they are fired or denied a promotion. They can't then go through the archives any more to take the screenshots.
thank you - this is what i was looking for
It works as long as no one takes a screenshot.
Re:Keybase Exploding Messages
by tylersmith on Wednesday June 20, 2018 @02:30PM
(#17358224)
Or even extract the text + signature before it "explodes". Keybase messages don't have repudiability so anybody who has received a sign message should be considered to always have that message.
Re:Keybase Exploding Messages
by WorldMaker on Wednesday June 20, 2018 @02:48PM
(#17358441)
Though the FAQ at the bottom of the article suggests some sort of minimal repudiation support is in the works.
Re:Keybase Exploding Messages
by giancarlostoro on Wednesday June 20, 2018 @02:26PM
(#17358174)
Apparently those dank memes and corporate espionage according to the article are some of the uses.