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Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by tptacek on Saturday June 02, 2018 @06:29PM (#17216745)
This argument doesn't work. The NSA is pretty universally believed to have optimized the DES s-boxes for resistance to differential cryptanalysis. Obviously, at the time differential was a NOBUS weakness --- NSA would have deployed it against competing cipher designs, which is sort of the whole point of employing cryptanalysts in the first place --- but it was never a NOBUS backdoor in NSA's own design.
Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by pdkl95 on Saturday June 02, 2018 @07:50PM (#17217068)
> DES ... it was never a NOBUS backdoor in NSA's own design

> Second, you can't argue that something is an NSA backdoor when NSA's only role in standardizing crypto relative to it is to make the standard resistant to it.

I'm not suggesting there was a backdoor in DES; I probably should have made that clearer.

> at the time differential was a NOBUS weakness

Exactly, this is what I'm talking about. This would (hypothetically) incentivise them encourage the use of designs that are vulnerable to the cryptanalysis method that only they know about.

> Dual EC is still a NOBUS backdoor. The "nobody but us" part of it is ensured cryptographically; breaking it likely involves solving the ECDLP

The fundamental problem with that type of NOBUS backdoor is that breaks when someone steals/blackmails/leaks the private key. This should be a concern to any agency that already experienced many of their secrets being exfiltrated by a contractor.

edit:

> (I think people generally used to assume that was true and I think that's less and less so every year)

I generally agree - this seems unlikely in practice, although I don't have good evidence for that belief.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by gdavisson on Sunday June 03, 2018 @03:05AM (#17218326)
It occurs to me that the NSA's behavior in this case is consistent with this being a situation like the DES s-boxes. If they designed Simon & Spec to be resistant to an attack that the open crypto community doesn't know about, they'd be really reluctant to talk about that design process or their internal cryptanalysis of them, for fear of giving away something about their secret attack(s).

So Simon & Spec might be ok. Maybe.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by api on Sunday June 03, 2018 @11:07AM (#17219862)
Wasn't that a past NSA under different leadership? Today's NSA may behave differently.
Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by tptacek on Sunday June 03, 2018 @11:09AM (#17219881)
It's not my argument that we should trust NSA. We shouldn't. It's that differential cryptanalysis isn't an example of how NSA would backdoor a cipher design, and that the nature of a NOBUS backdoor is more complex than "a weakness only the NSA knows about". Dual EC doesn't have a "weakness" so much as it has a cryptographically secure access mechanism.
Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by api on Sunday June 03, 2018 @12:16PM (#17220225)
If I were to place a bet I'd bet that Speck in particular is fine. It's so damn simple there is just no place to put a lever. But... it would not be a very large bet. :)
Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by notveryrational on Saturday June 02, 2018 @07:10PM (#17216919)
I don't think you understood the argument above.

My attempt to clarify it as I understood it:

The argument is that a unique-to-NSA analysis technique could be used to get NOBUS backdoor by virtue that only NSA would be able to use the analysis to get key/message recovery, etc. This is especially true if such a technique were combined with a unique-to-NSA ability to store or process characteristics of a cipher.

The NSA likely has both a unique cryptanalytic techniques and a considerable computational advantage.

The NSA has, before, refused to disclose the motivation for its designs because doing so could leak a unique-to-NSA analysis technique.

The argument (not fact) of the parent comment is that this could be the reason for NSA not disclosing its design rationale now. It could be a backdoor.

The entire purpose of the parent comment is to convey that it is conceivable to NOBUS backdoor simple symmetric ciphers with the resources of the NSA. As such, it is an appropriate response and an argument that _does_ work.

Side note: I remember (different username at the time) discussing with you here, on hacker news, whether DUAL_EC was a backdoor. Of course, that doesn't mean that there is a backdoor in this case.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by tptacek on Saturday June 02, 2018 @07:16PM (#17216946)
I understand the argument fine; it just doesn't cohere.

First, it's self-evident that differential cryptanalysis is not a good example of a NOBUS backdoor, since it was independently discovered multiple times, including by a pair of academics. By contrast, even after BULLRUN, Dual EC is still a NOBUS backdoor. The "nobody but us" part of it is ensured cryptographically; breaking it likely involves solving the ECDLP. It's not "nobody but us until somebody figures it out".

Second, you can't argue that something is an NSA backdoor when NSA's only role in standardizing crypto relative to it is to make the standard resistant to it.

Once again: the NSA may well have many cryptanalytic techniques unknown to the academic literature (I think people generally used to assume that was true and I think that's less and less so every year). But a NOBUS backdoor isn't simply a cipher that NSA can break and nobody else can break yet. It's a cipher that the NSA can break and cannot foresee any adversary breaking within the frontiers of its own knowledge. Whatever cryptanalytic techniques NSA can discover, so too can the Russians, Israelis, French, and Chinese.

The point of a NOBUS backdoor is that it's safe to deploy on your own systems.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by notveryrational on Saturday June 02, 2018 @07:22PM (#17216968)
The NSA is a pragmatic organization and is concerned only by "nobody but us until somebody figures it out", so long as there is an operational advantage it provides to the United States.

We should also note that "nobody but us until somebody figures it out" is true also of ECDLP. I'm not really interested in that argument, because we both know exactly where it goes. Is it different than symmetric cryptography? Yes. But we're talking about symmetric cryptography.

> Second, you can't argue that something is an NSA backdoor when NSA's only role in standardizing crypto relative to it is to make the standard resistant to it.

Nobody is.

Yes, the NSA almost certainly has unique-to-NSA analytic techniques. New techniques are discovered in the academic community on a regular basis - they aren't rare in some way that it would be reasonable to believe that a professional community of the world's best cryptographers with their own cryptanalytic communities, working full time, would have discovered and honed their own. In fact, it would be pretty unusual to believe they don't.

You misunderstand NOBUS. It's purely a pragmatic expression meaning advantage. NSA is under no illusions that their advantage in cryptography on every standard is going to last forever.

Please don't spread FUD on NOBUS.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by tptacek on Saturday June 02, 2018 @07:24PM (#17216974)
I don't understand the distinction you're trying to draw between block ciphers and the ECLDP. Dual EC was an RNG, which is (among other things) an important symmetric primitive. I think the definition of NOBUS that you're working is the one that's broken, not mine.

I also think you're overestimating the frequency with which powerful new techniques for attacking block ciphers occur in the literature. It's 2018 and the debate about Speck's security still hinged in part on Matsui. Fundamental new cryptanalytic techniques against block ciphers are, in fact, pretty rare.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by notveryrational on Saturday June 02, 2018 @07:26PM (#17216981)
> I don't understand the distinction you're trying to draw between block ciphers and the ECLDP. Dual EC was an RNG, which is (among other things) an important symmetric primitive. I think the definition of NOBUS that you're working is the one that's broken, not mine.

I'm not sure where we'll get with it. I'm okay with your misunderstanding.

Please ignore that part of the comment and read the remaining content. Please don't let an objection on a small part of the content distract you from the remaining content of the argument.

> I also think you're overestimating the frequency with which powerful new techniques for attacking block ciphers occur in the literature.

You are clearly underestimating the frequency.

We both understand how heavily caveated your argument referencing Matsui is.

My fear is that your misunderstanding and underestimation will lead to FUD about backdoors, like it did last time with DUAL_EC.

It's also important to note that your argument has shifted significantly in this short exchange.

NSA only cares about NOBUS weaknesses for operational and national security advantages.

Thanks for your time.

Re:Linux Cryptography: Speck's real standing with the academ... by tptacek on Saturday June 02, 2018 @08:48PM (#17217270)
I don't understand what you're trying to say about how "caveated" the Matsui reference is.