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Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by recursive on Thursday May 31, 2018 @01:24PM (#17198210)
The gist of it is that there's a timing attack on fancy stacks of blending modes. Calculating a final pixel color takes different amounts of time for different underlying pixels. So javascript can "scan" and OCR a page, or an iframe in that page.
Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by pishpash on Thursday May 31, 2018 @01:32PM (#17198299)
All doors are open for side channel leaks. Having programs run on your machine is like having someone watch your computer. The issue is how to control the exfiltration of that data from you computer. That's where the sandbox should be focused on.
Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by _yosefk on Thursday May 31, 2018 @02:16PM (#17198679)
Not sure why this is being downvoted. I admit that I find it hard to see how to control the exfiltration of data once it's been figured out by a badly sandboxed program. But the idea that systematically addressing side channel attacks in a sandbox is really hard seems very valid. I mean, the exploit described in TFA is quite the argument in favor of this point.
Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by ploxiln on Thursday May 31, 2018 @05:43PM (#17200575)
I wonder if we'll ever get back to "go ahead and browse random script-free websites, but only run trusted code". I guess it's way too late for that. We'll be patching side-channels forever.
Re:Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 features by anglebracket on Thursday May 31, 2018 @03:51PM (#17199568)
Yes, this isn't even the first cross-domain leakage attack on iframes using CSS. [0] There were similar issues with how hit testing was implemented for `document.elementFromPoint()`[1], and probably tons of other things I'm forgetting.

Ideally cross-origin framing would have been disallowed by default but frames were added to the spec before people spent a lot of time thinking about the same-origin-policy implications.

[0]: https://www.contextis.com/resources/white-papers/pixel-perfe... [1]: http://blog.saynotolinux.com/blog/2014/02/05/whats-that-smel...