Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by smsm42 on Tuesday May 15, 2018 @04:56PM
(#17077797)
It entrusts the identity to carriers. What use of having perfect peer-to-peer security if you can't be sure who you are talking to? So you will send the data to Eve in a perfectly secure way, while thinking you're talking to Bob - and that's better than Eve breaking the encryption? I say it's much less work for Eve - instead of employing vast resources to exploit a tiny vulnerability in encryption, she would just need to take over a phone number. And if she works for the government, it's not even a hard thing to do.
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Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by twr on Tuesday May 15, 2018 @06:50PM
(#17078605)
Again, you can be sure, by comparing the safety numbers. It's the same as comparing SSH or GPG key fingerprints. If someone else masquerades as Bob, the numbers won't match. See section III-D3, key fingerprint verification:
https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2015/papers-archived/6949...
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by smsm42 on Wednesday May 16, 2018 @03:20PM
(#17085562)
That would be true if people routinely verified fingerprints of their contacts. I don't think it happens more often than any other commonly ignored security precautions. Also, what happens if the phone is lost/damaged/replaced with a newer model? I assume new key and thus new fingerprint?
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by twr on Wednesday May 16, 2018 @04:43PM
(#17086294)
Signal, WhatsApp, Matrix et al. show notifications when the participant’s device keys change. You’re right that most users don’t verify. The opportunity for detection or prevention of common forms of surveillance is better than none at all.