So forcing the fine on the last step in the chain forces everyone to carefully consider who they trust, which is as it should be. Nothing wrong with trust between trusted parties, but clearly the current system has untrustworthy parties given too much power.
That's the thing though, a lot of times they don't control the spoofed number, but there's a legitimate use case for spoofing it. Authorization to spoof is not the same as having control of a number.
The issue is that the PSTN is essentially a huge, worldwide message queue to which pretty much any telco can connect around the world, including shady ones - even if US law actually does fight spoofing, how do you prevent telcos from other countries from continuing the abuse?
Cryptography is needed - when a carrier leases you a number, they give you a certificate with which you can sign other carrier’s certificates if you want to let them use that number as caller ID. Every carrier on the call chain should verify call’s signatures against that and discard any calls with missing or invalid signatures. That will stop malicious spoofing while allowing its legitimate use, just like email where you can use SPF and DKIM to nominate any email provider to be able to send on your domain’s behalf.
If I complain about a call, that should be trackable to the origination carrier and account, and if either one gets too many complaints, it gets thrown off the network (and other penalties).
If you want to place a call with spoofed caller ID info, your provider should require you to prove that the spoofed information is legitimate, not fraudulent. Otherwise, the telco should be obligated to strip the suspect caller ID information from the call so that the recipient can properly identify the call as fishy.
There's no need for any complicated cryptographic solution. Telcos should just be required to know their customer, much like banks, before allowing them to do certain things.