You can't just call something a safety system. You have to prove that it is a safety system by testing it, which is something that Uber hadn't done before they disabled the existing system.
But those two points seem distinct from the idea of disabling a system in order to have a better understanding of what's going on. Suppose they had built a car that was safe, conditioned on the presence a black box system that they likely didn't have access to the internals of - would this be satisfactory?
If Uber could demonstrate, through the analysis of a statistically significant number of events, that its system was actually safer without the car manufacturer's override (e.g. if all the events were false positives), then it would be appropriate to disable it at that time. That's how you do it.
However you describe the (potential) black box nature of the existing system as a red herring -> to be honest, this is what I'm most interested in. My opinion is that including a black box component into a saftey-critical system would be inappropriate. Do you disagree with that? If your answer is "probe it until it's no longer a black box and then include it", would you not consider that to be overall semantically equivalent to "don't include a black box"?
Firstly, it assumes Volvo is not sharing the parameters of the system. It seems unlikely that Uber is installing an automated driving system into these cars without the cooperation of Volvo, especially with the agreement to ultimately get 24,000 autonomous-system-equipped cars from them.
Secondly, if Uber could instead determine what it wants to know about the parameters by testing, then the question is irrelevant, as are the semantics.
Thirdly, it is presumably safe for humans to be driving cars without knowing the exact parameters, and so should not present any particular problem for the autonomous system - if the emergency brakes are triggered, it is likely to be a situation in which it is the right thing to happen, and possibly a result of the autonomous system failing. Just as for human drivers, an autonomous system is expected to usually stay within the parameters of the emergency system, without reference to those parameters, just by driving correctly. For example, if the emergency brakes come on to stop the car from hitting a pedestrian because the autonomous system failed to correctly identify the danger, what difference would it have made if the system knew the exact parameters of the emergency braking system?
Lastly, the road is an environment with a lot of uncertainty and unpredictability. If the system is so fragile that the tiny amount of uncertainty of not knowing the exact parameters of the automatic braking system raises safety concerns, then it is nowhere near being a system with the flexibility to drive safely.
It is possible that a competent autonomous driving system might supplant the current emergency braking system, in which case the way to proceed is to demonstrate it in the way I outlined in the last paragraph of my previous post.
It's not like Software of Unknown Provenance where it's running in the same execution environment and you don't have any control. This was a completely separate system with independent sensors that was marketed to stop the car in the exact situation the car failed to stop in. Disabling it was foolhardy.
The responsible position would be to retain the existing system in a passive standby mode, capable of overriding the active 'under test' one in the event certain safety/detection thresholds were exceeded.
There is a reason for there being such a thing as a crash-test dummy, and for crash tests being done in elaborate facilities that simulate crashes. It is because testing how a vehicle handles a crash in live (literally) situations is both ineffective and unethical.
The purpose of the system under test is to drive safely. If the simple safety override was triggered, then that was probably a failure of the autonomous driving system. Any case where it was not could be identified afterwards, by analysis.
Furthermore, when you have a complex system controlling potentially dangerous machinery, it is a sound engineering principle to include simple 'censors' to catch the rare corner cases that are a feature of complex systems, no matter how carefully designed and thoroughly tested. Nuclear systems have a number of independent safety systems that can scram the reactor, each in response to a single specific condition. Disabling them for a test is what happened at Chernobyl.