News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by slg on Friday May 04, 2018 @06:27PM (#16998921)
>16. The previous people who did a similar analysis did not have a direct pipeline to the wisdom of the ages. There is therefore no reason to believe their analysis over yours. There is especially no reason to present their analysis as yours.

>19. The odds are greatly against you being immensely smarter than everyone else in the field. If your analysis says your terminal velocity is twice the speed of light, you may have invented warp drive, but the chances are a lot better that you've screwed up.

Learning how to better thread the needle between these two is been one of the most important things I have learned in my career. Just because this is the way it was always done doesn't mean we have to do it that way, but the people who did it that way probably had some reason for it that is worth exploring and fully understanding.

Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by derefr on Friday May 04, 2018 @08:24PM (#16999509)
I don't see these as opposed principles.

16. They're not smart.

19. You're not smart, either.

Assume everyone is an idiot, including yourself. Verify everything (your own work and other people's work) using robust testing protocols. Don't use your own judgement; you're not smart enough for that. Gather evidence. But test your evidence-gatherers to make sure they're doing their jobs, too. Assume every component of your system-of-people is half-fallen-down and just barely limping along at all times. Make a system that works in the face of everyone coming to work with a concussion.

(And, if some component isn't barely limping along, then people are probably being too naive about its potential failures, so inject some chaos [monkeys] into it to get its reliability down to a level where routing around it has to be operationalized, too.)

Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by hyperpallium on Friday May 04, 2018 @11:40PM (#17000202)
In WWII, bullet holes in planes had to be repaired. But the damage wasn't uniform - some areas got badly shot up, some areas were never damaged. So they added armour to the undamaged areas, because the planes that got shot there never came back.

Similar idea from another angle: superficial design flaws obscure fundamental design flaws (Douglas Adams on the Sirius Corporation Complaints Depatment)

Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by baxtr on Saturday May 05, 2018 @03:08AM (#17000754)
Or: they’re smart and you’re smart, too
Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by Mtinie on Friday May 04, 2018 @06:47PM (#16999056)
> Put very simply: don’t destroy what you don’t understand.

“Chesterson’s fence”

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Chesterton%27s_fen...

Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by JepZ on Sunday May 06, 2018 @09:15AM (#17006309)
Didn't know that principle had a name, but I love it.

Once I have seen a project manager who's project didn't deliver much insight, so he had this brilliant idea to advise to replace some software which was built with some old technology. He didn't have the slightest clue how that software worked, he just knew what the purpose of the software was and his advise was to rebuilt it with newer technology to make it better (whatever that means).

When I told him, that the software wasn't as trivial as he might think and that I am against replacing it, as long as it wasn't clear how the new version would be better (besides being built with that new technology he was suggesting) he started looking for some other findings his project could deliver.

Re:Akin's Laws of Spacecraft Design (2003) by jgsteven on Saturday May 05, 2018 @02:02PM (#17002898)
I first read "direct pipeline to the wisdom of the ages" as referring to the internet. But now I am guessing it means that just like you don't have all relevant past information and analysis, neither did they.