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Re:Amazon threatens to suspend Signal's AWS account over cen... by tialaramex on Wednesday May 02, 2018 @05:42PM (#16981406)
In TLS False Start the client sends encrypted data to an unknown remote party. It hopes they're the intended recipient, but it won't actually know until it gets a reassuring Finished message which is too late. Now, if it isn't really the intended recipient the remote party doesn't have all the keys it should have. So cross fingers they can't decrypt the data they've been sent. But this is... less than ideal. It's a high price to pay for performance.

In TLS 1.3 that 1RTT completes the handshake so as the client we know who we're taking to.

That SNI draft is the result of interested parties coming up with a list of desirable properties for SNI encryption. If you have a better idea that satisfies those properties you absolutely should propose it.

Re:Amazon threatens to suspend Signal's AWS account over cen... by toast0 on Wednesday May 02, 2018 @06:45PM (#16981814)
I don't have a better idea, I don't think it's possible.

When a server has multiple identities to choose from, and the client has not previously communicated with (and has no no out of band information), as far as I can tell, either the SNI has to be in plain text, or it could be encrypted with an untrusted DHE key (which only eliminates passive detection).

Way upthread, bscphil wondered if [big companies] will oppose encrypted SNI to avoid having their IP ranges banned, but their business reasons don't really flow into a decision not to do impossible things.