I do agree with Brown, to be clear, but some of the excesses of subsequent decisions and their application are great examples of the dangers of judicial activism.
If you think that everyone before 1954 was interpreting the amendment incorrectly, that's equivalent to saying that the generally accepted meaning of the text changed, and therefore the law changed without any legislative action.
A pure originalist might look to what the framers of the 14th amendment thought they were doing, but most people we would call originalists today would look to what the text of the 14th amendment meant at the time it was written.
> If you think that everyone before 1954 was interpreting the amendment incorrectly, that's equivalent to saying that the generally accepted meaning of the text changed
People often write things that mean something different than what the text says. (I'll point to FOSTA/SESTA as a contemporary example. 98% of the people who voted for it are thinking that its directed at sites actively promoting sex trafficking, but by its plain terms it applies to anyone "facilitating" sex trafficking, which is a much broader word.)
I can think of a few possibilities:
1. Pre-1950s courts were consistently incompetent and didn't understand the meaning of the 14th amendment.
2. Pre-1950s courts were consistently malicious and deliberately ignored the meaning of the 14th amendment.
3. Pre-1950s courts were correct about the meaning, and post-1950s courts have universally abandoned originalism and now apply their own invented meaning of the 14th amendment.
4. The meaning of the 14th amendment changed.
In fact, there was a short span of time immediately post civil war where civil rights were effectively enforced in the South. Reconstruction ended too soon.
I think it's very important for people to understand how fluid the Supreme Court can be and how much it responds to public opinion, in choosing which cases to accept and deciding them. Look for example at the unanimous 180 between Pace v. Alabama and Loving v. Virginia. In Loving, the court declares
"To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
None of this is in the text, this interpretation of "the principle of equality" isn't really supported by an originalist analysis, and it doesn't turn on the particular facts presented to the court.
Your example isn't one of them, though, and in fact the decision in it expressly holds out that the issues would have been different had the plaintiffs had challenged the unequal service rather than the tax. (Largely the same Court had only just before that handed down the “separate but equal” rule in Plessy v. Ferguson, forget original intent, Cumming has an incredibly strained handwave to get out from dealing with Plessy.
> None of this is in the text, this interpretation of "the principle of equality" isn't really supported by an originalist analysis
I disagree; it's perhaps hard to support by a textualist analysis (but not that hard, even there), but it's not hard at all to support with an originalist one. The fact that the national political climate rather swiftly abandoned the intent of the brief moment of radical Republican triumphalism when the 14th Amendment was passed and imposed on the South by force and that subsequent decisions reflect that change in the mood is, of course, important to note.