I think these ideas will change the world for the better.
Note that this repo has been sidelined, as I have fundamental issues with the protocol SSB is built on. Unless there's changes to how the messages are signed and verified, I'm not planning on putting any serious effort into SSB.
{
"previous": "%26AC+gU0t74jRGVeDY01...MnutGGHM=.sha256",
"author": "@hxGxqPrplLjRG2vtjQL87...0nNwE=.ed25519",
"sequence": 216,
"timestamp": 1442590513298,
"hash": "sha256",
"content": {
"type": "vote",
"vote": {
"link": "%WbQ4dq0m/zu5jxll9zUb...KjZ80JvI=.sha256",
"value": 1
}
}
}
Signed example message: {
"previous": "%26AC+gU0t74jRGVeDY01...MnutGGHM=.sha256",
"author": "@hxGxqPrplLjRG2vtjQL87...0nNwE=.ed25519",
"sequence": 216,
"timestamp": 1442590513298,
"hash": "sha256",
"content": {
"type": "vote",
"vote": {
"link": "%WbQ4dq0m/zu5jxll9zUb...KjZ80JvI=.sha256",
"value": 1
}
}
"signature": "Sjq1C3yiKdmi1TWvNqxI...gmAQ==.sig.ed25519"
}
The signature covers the whole message, and is then added into the message it signed. The way this works means you have to encode json exactly the same way as the "main" node.js implementation. Emojis, unicode, html literals, EVERYTHING. Or else it will fail to verify. I've gotten most of it working, but there's still edge cases where I gave up trying to get them to work correctly.The SPKI version of a message would look something like (I've removed the hash property, because I don't think it makes sense for an object to specify the hash to be used to refer to it, but one could add it back in if one wished):
(message
(previous (hash sha256 |XphMUkWQtomKjXQvFGfsGYpt69sgEY7Y4Vou9cEuJho=|))
(author (public-key (ed25519 |FCX/tsDLpubCPKKfIrw4gc+SQkHcaD17s7GI6i/ziWY=|)))
(sequence 216)
(timestamp "2018-04-19T17:53:26Z")
(content (type vote)
(link (hash sha256 |DlBH/hCmXfVzks2uY+WIll4aTzxrfBA8m/3GIdX3Vew=|))
(value 1)))
The transport version would be this (you can Base64-decode it to see the canonical version): {KDc6bWVzc2FnZSg4OnByZXZpb3VzKDQ6aGFzaDY6c2hhMjU2MzI6XphMUkWQtomKjXQvFGfsGYpt
69sgEY7Y4Vou9cEuJhopKSg2OmF1dGhvcigxMDpwdWJsaWMta2V5KDc6ZWQyNTUxOTMyOhQl/7bA
y6bmwjyinyK8OIHPkkJB3Gg9e7OxiOov84lmKSkpKDg6c2VxdWVuY2UzOjIxNikoOTp0aW1lc3Rh
bXAyMDoyMDE4LTA0LTE5VDE3OjUzOjI2WikoNzpjb250ZW50KDQ6dHlwZTQ6dm90ZSkoNDpsaW5r
KDQ6aGFzaDY6c2hhMjU2MzI6DlBH/hCmXfVzks2uY+WIll4aTzxrfBA8m/3GIdX3VewpKSg1OnZh
bHVlMToxKSkp}
And a signed message might look something like: (sequence
(message
(previous (hash sha256 |XphMUkWQtomKjXQvFGfsGYpt69sgEY7Y4Vou9cEuJho=|))
(author (public-key (ed25519 |FCX/tsDLpubCPKKfIrw4gc+SQkHcaD17s7GI6i/ziWY=|)))
(sequence 216)
(timestamp "2018-04-19T17:53:26Z")
(content (type vote)
(link (hash sha256 |DlBH/hCmXfVzks2uY+WIll4aTzxrfBA8m/3GIdX3Vew=|))
(value 1)))
(signature (hash sha256 |XphMUkWQtomKjXQvFGfsGYpt69sgEY7Y4Vou9cEuJho=|)
(hash sha256 |5hHMWc1PqfrwFVfALci5JXCWqW7VC4I4iS4+Utvr44w=|)
|z7W1ERg9UYZjNfE72ZwEuJF79khG+eOHWFp6iF+KLuSrw8Lqa6IousK4cCn9T5qFa8E14GVek4cAMmMbjqDnAg==|))
Canonical S-expressions already buy you bit-for-bit identity when hashing, and SPKI (as an example) wraps signatures rather than injecting them — the only sane choice.Why do I bring this up? Obviously it's possible to make JSON be a cryptographically-sound format (either by foregoing objects for arrays, or by rules around object-field ordering, along with other rules about encoding), but using it instead of an already-sound format indicates an unfamiliarity with prior work in the field.
(message
(previous (hash sha256 |XphMUkWQtomKjXQvFGfsGYpt69sgEY7Y4Vou9cEuJho=|))
(author (public-key (ed25519 |FCX/tsDLpubCPKKfIrw4gc+SQkHcaD17s7GI6i/ziWY=|)))
(sequence "216")
(timestamp "2018-04-19T17:53:26Z")
(content (type vote)
(link (hash sha256 |DlBH/hCmXfVzks2uY+WIll4aTzxrfBA8m/3GIdX3Vew=|))
(value "1")))Even though it's super low bitrate(1200bps/9600bps) since you have a binary foundation w/ base64 you can send raw binary to get low over-head but then easily verify+decode since base64 is well supported across a wide range of languages.
Other data formats that are ordered, and serialize somewhat more deterministically, are CBOR, Protobufs, or s-exp.
This is not your usual startup launch, it's a community project by multiple open source hackers. If something is missing, you can make it happen. And there are so many ongoing developments right now (see list below), that it really doesn't make sense, at this point, to point out the current problems with the protocol. It's evolving fast, and can evolve even faster if you choose to make it your own and do something about it.
Here are a couple of things being developed:
- Mobile app for Android
- Better cryptographically-verified user invites
- P2P replication over WebRTC
- P2P replication over DHT (Kademlia)
- Better scalability (Epidemic broadcast trees)
- GitHub alternative
- "Out-of-order" replication (get messages from distant friends of your friends)
- Private groups
- Moderation tools (every person as a moderator)
- Socio-technical discussion around data accountability
- New RPC stack, rewrite
- Rust client
- Go implementation
- C implementation
- Groundwork for iOS support
- Multi-devices accounts
- Scuttlebutt on Firefox as an extension
- Overall improving onboarding and docs
- Replication over Bluetooth and Wi-Fi P2P
- Web viewer
- Scuttlebutt cloud (easy way of setting up servers)
- Websites on scuttlebutt
- etc
It's a moving target