Encryption has nothing to do with it. The whole issue with CA was that they (just as many apps before them) were using Facebook social graph data that was available for them to access via the API. Encryption on any layer has nothing to do with it - if you have access to the API, you get the data. In distributed system, if you are a node in the system, you have to have access to social graph data - otherwise the whole concept of social network does not work. You can't "see what your friends are doing" if there's no information about who your "friends" are. And if the nodes on the network have information about who your friends are - or can get that information - then they have the same access as CA (and many other apps before them) had. Facebook can at least (if they wanted to) cut off the external API and not tell the social graph structure to anybody outside Facebook. I don't see how this is possible in a distributed network.
If you start integrating Tor/i2p hidden services, even global passive network adversaries will struggle to figure out the social graph from network monitoring.
We don't currently allow third party apps in Peergos, and when we do they won't be able to access the social graph, nor will they be able to connect to the internet, nor anything else outside peergos. So that data can't be exfiltrated.
What data are you talking about that can easily be crawled without any permissions?
If it is that simple then maybe Scuttlebutt isn't a good protocol, but a secure end-to-end platform like this is definitely possible. And if anyone is going to build it it's not going to be a company who makes all of their cash from harvesting user data.
I guess I just don't understand what accountability there is to be even had? If I send an encrypted message to my friend, who is accountable? What are they accountable for?
If I'm sending illegal content to someone only I can be held accountable (and possibly the person I'm sending to). Is that any different in Scuttlebutts case?
As far as GDPR goes, you're right because you're specifically choosing people to send it to. However, having a mechanism to delete your messages on other people's systems when they sync would probably go a long way.
It is my understanding at the moment that it's not scientifically possible to do this. If I'm mistaken I would love to hear a proposal for doing this, but I don't understand how full read access can be revokable once you have the data and a way to decrypt it. DRM doesn't count/work.
Also, the way the protocol works is that clients discover the most recent log entry number, and then request all "missing" ones. So that delete message would be more like a "please overwrite message id 29342 with zeros or something".
From what I understand of SSB,it works by distributing messages to receiving users as part of a blockchain, making all messages effectively public, even if not published with the goal of giving the public access. But maybe similar functionality could be added by setting up private "clubs" - pub servers set up by groups of users who know and trust each other - which would play the same role as a Hubzilla hub, storing private messages and displaying them to users who can authenticate correctly.
Yeah, it is worse because if you screw up, you don't have anyone to blame but yourself.
You have complete control over your data.
No, not at all! TOR is fully encrypted, but there are somewhat regular vulnerability reports about various parts of the stack. Including criticial vulnerabilities that can and have been exploited by nation states, for example.
> This is no worse than Facebook though
This is not at all clear to me. The attack surface for Scuttlebutt is much larger, and I trust Facebook's security team to audit and patch much more than I trust any random friend.
Sure, but I wouldn't choose "a random friend" to run my FB replacement service, I'd choose a trusted friend. And more importantly, no matter how good Facebooks security team are at patching and auditing servers - THEY ARE THE ADVERSARY IN THIS CONTEXT!
How does this relate to scuttlebutt? There's no scuttlebutt “service”; it's a tool and a protocol, like a pen and the English language.
> no matter how good Facebooks security team are at patching and auditing servers - THEY ARE THE ADVERSARY IN THIS CONTEXT!
I think this is the salient point: if you send data to your friend, they necessarily have that data and can leak it; but there's no need for a stranger with unknown motives (Facebook) to also have that data.
Your friend can, but Facebook can scrutinize third-party apps. In a decentralized world, there's no one who has access to holistically examine automated access and detect shady activity. In a decentralized world, everything is essentially a third-party app.
The other thing I’ve seen a lot of people use are notifications / invites. e.g. most big gaming communities are bad experiences but you can bootstrap your friends into a better group. That seems harder to change and it’s definitely a real need.
Basically only automation & power users.
I can assure you that they don't. Anyone can have a third-party app that scavenges for private info.
See: Cambridge Analytica.
>there's no one who has access to holistically examine automated access and detect shady activity
There is. It is you. You can shut off access your data any time you want to. Yes, if you give someone access to some data, that data could potentially be out there forever but you can revoke access to your (future) data freely.
And, most importantly, the same is true for literally any platform.
One quick look at people taking screen shots of snapchat posts shows how deletion of data from a platform like FB or Snapchat is irrelevant - viewers of that data can always copy it.
About accountability: if YOU are compromised, your friends' data are compromised, and vice versa. Are you saying that the median security skill of your friends are higher than Facebook? Because any of them can leak your data unintentionally.
About encryption: it's freaking useless in this case. Remember, some people fall for Nigeria prince scam. And what happen when their keys are compromised? See above.
That's the crux of the argument: you can't guarantee that your precious friends and family can safeguard their keys (in fact, I doubt my personal security practice is remotely as good as FB or Google or Amazon or MS or Apple). In that case, by the virtual of distribution, your data is copied everywhere, waiting for any key to compromise.
Huh? Scuttlebutt is fully encrypted.. doesn't that make the API vastly more locked down than Facebook/etc?
> There is a clear issue with Facebook's accountability in these areas. Distributed systems are typically open source, they run on multiple servers by different owners, this leads to zero accountability.
This is no worse than Facebook though. With Facebook, your friend could steal all of the data you let them see. With Scuttlebutt, your friend could steal all of the data you let them see.
At least with this I control who sees my data, no? Sure, I can't have accountability with a friend, but at least no company/etc has access to my data.
> GDPR compliance about deleting data is almost impossible in a distributed system.
Doesn't GDPR apply to companies? If my mom sends me a physical card, do I have to adhere to GDPR laws with her address/name? How is that any different than Scuttlebutt?